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In today’s society, most people receive their health insurance through their
employers.1 If their employment-based insurer engages in cost cutting that leads to
patient injury, Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”)
preemption means that these people have no state tort-based recourse against their
insurers.2 ERISA is a federal statute that regulates employee benefit plans, and the
Supreme Court has interpreted the ERISA statute to preempt most beneficiary state
tort claims against an employment-based insurer.3 In other words, even if the insurer,
and not the doctor, caused the patient’s harm, the patient with employment-based
insurance can only sue their health care provider for medical malpractice, with very
limited federal remedies available against the insurer. However, when the Affordable
Care Act (“ACA”) individual exchanges come into play in 2014, the number of
individuals with non-employment-based insurance will likely expand and so will
their remedies for insurer cost cutting that results in patient harm.
Imagine it is 2014 and Bill Smith does not have employment-based insurance, so
he buys insurance from a Health Maintenance Organization (“HMO”), XYZ
Insurance Company, through his State’s individual exchange. XYZ is concerned
about high costs within the individual exchange, so they have set up incentives or
bonuses for general practitioners in their network to keep patients in-house, if at all
possible, instead of referring them to specialists. Bill Smith goes to see Dr. Jones, a
general practitioner in XYZ’s network, for treatment for a skin lesion. Dr. Jones is
eager to receive his bonus, concerned that excessive referrals might cause him to be
terminated from XYZ’s network, and believes that the lesion is a simple cyst that he
can dispose of without referral to a specialist. Accordingly, Dr. Jones treats the cyst
in-house. Unfortunately, the cyst is actually a virulent form of cancer that requires
highly skilled treatment from a dermatologist and/or oncologist. Due to the delay in
receiving specialty care, Bill dies and his estate sues Dr. Jones for malpractice and
XYZ under theories of corporate negligence and apparent agency.
Since Bill is buying his insurance through the individual exchange and not
receiving his insurance through his employer, ERISA preemption does not apply,
1

CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & JESSICA C. SMITH, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011,
at 21 (Sept. 2012), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p60-243.pdf (finding
that 55.1% of Americans receive their health insurance through their employer, whereas only
3.6% directly purchased their insurance coverage).
2

Robert A. Schapiro, Not Old or Borrowed: The Truly New Blue Federalism, 3 HARV. L.
& POL’Y REV. 33, 46-47 (2009) (noting that the Supreme Court has interpreted ERISA to
preempt State law claims against employment-based HMOs without providing a federal
substitute remedy).
3

Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52 (1987) (holding that the ERISA
enforcement scheme is the exclusive remedy for plan participants and beneficiaries and “that
varying state causes of action for claims within the scope of [the ERISA enforcement scheme]
would pose an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of Congress”).
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and therefore his tort claim against XYZ is a viable claim.4 On the surface, equity
favors providing an individual exchange beneficiary with recourse for insurer
wrongdoing, especially when compared to the lack of remedies available to
beneficiaries with employment-based insurance. However, the situation is not so
simple and raises a troubling dilemma. While the lack of ERISA preemption opens
up a new damage recovery source for individual exchange beneficiaries, it hinders
the ability of individual exchange insurers to engage in cost cutting measures that
eliminate waste and fight potentially high costs within the exchanges.5 High costs, in
turn, will likely be passed along to beneficiaries in the form of higher premiums.
Given the impacts of the lack of ERISA preemption within the individual exchanges,
to quote “Men at Work,” insurers will “not be the only one[s] saying it’s a mistake.”6
This Article seeks to address this dilemma in an effort to balance beneficiary
access to damages when insurer cost cutting causes harm and properly incentivize
insurers to engage in beneficial cost cutting and to keep down exchange costs, so that
the exchanges can thrive. Section I starts by outlining insurance coverage access
problems for high-risk individuals prior to the passage of the ACA, and the ACA’s
efforts to expand coverage access. Section II addresses concerns that the ACA access
expansion provisions may lead to adverse selection and high costs with regard to the
individual exchanges. Section III outlines how insurers may respond to adverse
selection and high costs within the individual exchanges through cost cutting
measures. Section IV discusses insurer tort liability, the operation of ERISA
preemption, and the impact of the lack of ERISA preemption on the individual
exchanges. Finally, Section V outlines potential solutions to the ERISA problem
with a proposal for a no-fault insurer liability fund solution.
I. INSURANCE COVERAGE ACCESS
A. Pre-ACA Insurance Access Problems
Prior to the ACA, many individual consumers without employment-based health
insurance—especially those who were high-risk—had difficulty procuring affordable
or, in some cases, any health insurance.7 The culprits behind these access problems
have been adverse selection and insurer efforts to combat adverse selection. Adverse
selection is the tendency of high-risk, costly consumers to seek out health insurance
coverage, more so than low-risk, less costly consumers.8 The former are more
motivated to seek out insurance because they have superior knowledge about their
4

29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006) (ERISA preempts State law as applied to employee benefit
plans).
5
Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, Health Care’s “Thirty Years War”: The
Origins and Dissolution of Managed Care, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 283, 316-17 (2004)
(arguing that ERISA preemption has allowed managed care to be more ruthless in its cost
cutting strategies).
6

MEN AT WORK, IT’S A MISTAKE (Epic 1983).

7

Stewart Jay, On Slippery Constitutional Slopes and the Affordable Care Act, 44 CONN.
L. REV. 1133, 1139 (2012) (noting that historically, health insurance has been unaffordable
and unavailable to those that do not have Medicaid, Medicare, or receive insurance through
their employer).
8

Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113
YALE L.J. 1223, 1235-37 (2004).
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risk level than insurers do.9 As more and more high-risk beneficiaries seek out
coverage, insurance rates rise to cover the costs of the high-risk population and more
and more low-risk enrollees drop coverage.10 The result is a death spiral, as
premiums continue to rise and more and more healthy consumers drop coverage.11
In the pre-ACA world, insurers used a variety of tools to combat adverse
selection, including pre-existing condition exclusions, experience rating, waiting
periods, and rescission based on nondisclosure of pre-existing condition.12 However,
insurers focused these efforts primarily on the individual market because the large
group and self-insured markets13—which were mostly large group employers—were
thought to function well without much adverse selection.14 Moreover, ERISA and
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) limited the
ability of employment-based insurers and self-insured employers, but not individual
insurers, to use such tools.15 Accordingly, the primary focus of insurer favorable
selection measures, such as cherry-picking, experience rating, pre-existing condition
exclusion, and rescission, was the individual market.16
While favorable selection measures can keep down insurance costs, they
obviously hinder access for high-risk beneficiaries. Hence, the pre-ACA access
problems for high-risk individuals.17 Insurers used favorable selection tools to screen
out or price these individuals out of the market, keep costs down, and avoid the

9

Id. at 1223 (describing adverse selection as a process whereby enrollees “utilize private
knowledge of their own riskiness when deciding to buy or forgo insurance”).
10
Ronen Avraham, The Economics of Insurance Law: A Primer, 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 29, 44
(2012).
11

Id.

12

Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Health Care Reform by
Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 134-35 (2011) (explaining that insurers have
rescinded coverage for even innocent omissions or misstatements on policy applications); Len
M. Nichols, State Regulation: What Have We Learned So Far?, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L.
175, 179-80 (2000) (explaining that individual insurance markets collapse unless insurers can
use pre-existing condition exclusions and waiting periods to combat adverse selection).
13

Self-insured plans are those in which the employer pays out employee insurance claims
directly and no insurer is involved.
14

Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Loopholes in the Affordable Care Act: Regulatory Gaps &
Border Crossing Techniques & How to Address Them, 5 ST. LOUIS U.J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
27, 29 (2011).
15

Id. at 29-30.

16

Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 12, at 176 (describing individual health insurance
markets as dysfunctional for both low-risk and high-risk enrollees, subjecting both “to
significant risks associated with unanticipated coverage restrictions, rescissions, non-renewals,
large rate increases, and preexisting condition exclusions”).
17

JULIE PEPER ET AL., WAKELY CONSULTING GROUP, ACTUARIAL ANALYSIS: IMPACT OF THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (ACA) ON SMALL GROUP & INDIVIDUAL MARKET PREMIUMS IN
OREGON 26 (July 31, 2012), available at http://www.wakely.com/wp-content/uploads/
2012/10/OR_ACA_Market_Premium_Impact_wletter_20120731.pdf
(finding
a
25%
insurance denial rate in Oregon’s individual market).
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death spiral. Consequently, prior to the ACA, not much of an individual health
insurance market existed, especially not for those considered to be high-risk.18
B. ACA Insurance Access Expansion and the Benefit to High-Risk Beneficiaries
The ACA transforms the existing health insurance market by expanding
insurance access for all, but particularly for high-risk beneficiaries. Broadly, it does
so through a voluntary Medicaid expansion,19 the creation of insurance exchanges,20
and various prohibitions against favorable selection tools within the individual
insurance market.21 With these changes, individual high-risk consumers who
previously did not have access to insurance should have access to a new marketplace
for insurance.
To illustrate the drastic change, in 2009, the individual insurance market covered
only 16.7 million people or 6% of the insurance market.22 By 2020, the individual
exchange market is predicted to grow to 26.9 million, or even as much as 65.3
million, if employers drop employment-based coverage and shift employees onto the
individual market.23 These numbers could be even higher, as the Congressional
Budget Office has predicted that the now optional nature of the Medicaid expansion
will grow the exchanges further.24
A number of ACA reforms are directly aimed at improving insurance access for
high-risk beneficiaries both inside and outside of the exchanges. Such regulations
include the guarantee access and renewability requirements,25 the prohibition against
premiums based on health status,26 the prohibition against discrimination based on

18

Martha B. Coven, The Freedom to Spend: The Case for Cash-Based Public Assistance,
86 MINN. L. REV. 847, 885-86 (2002) (arguing that cash-based assistance to individuals to
purchase health insurance is not sufficient to expand coverage because of the lack of robust
individual health insurance markets in the United States).
19

42 U.S.C.A. § 1396(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (West 2013).

20

Id. § 18031.

21

Id. §§ 300gg-300gg-7 (provisions prohibiting preexisting condition exclusions,
requiring modified community rating, requiring guaranteed availability and renewability of
coverage, prohibiting discrimination based on health status, providing for Essential Health
Benefits coverage, and prohibiting excessive waiting periods).
22

PAUL H. KECKLEY ET AL., DELOITTE CTR. FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, THE IMPACT OF
HEALTH REFORM ON THE INDIVIDUAL INSURANCE MARKET: A STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT 4
(2011), available at https://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/
Documents/Health%20Reform%20Issues%20Briefs/us_chs_HealthReformAndTheIndividualI
nsuranceMarket_IssueBrief_101011.pdf.
23

Id. at 7-8.

24
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATES FOR INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION 12 (July 2012),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43472-07-24-2012CoverageEstimates.pdf (predicting that the Supreme Court decision on the Medicaid
expansion will grow the exchange rolls by 3 million by the year 2022).
25

42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300gg-1(a), -2(a) (West 2013).

26

Id. § 300gg(a).
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health status,27 the prohibition against preexisting condition exclusions,28 and the
prohibition against waiting periods of longer than ninety days.29 Each of these
requirements and prohibitions is aimed at practices that insurers previously used to
screen out high-risk beneficiaries, keep costs down, and avoid adverse selection.
Similarly, the ACA’s Essential Health Benefits (“EHBs”) requirement benefits
high-risk beneficiaries by mandating that small group and individual insurers, both
inside and outside of the exchanges, guarantee beneficiaries access to certain
EHBs,30 such as hospitalization and emergency services.31 Moreover, insurers must
cover at least 60% of the actuarial value of EHBs.32 In other words, an insurer cannot
eliminate or limit a particular essential benefit for a high-risk group of beneficiaries
just because it would be too expensive to provide such coverage for those
beneficiaries. The ACA also prohibits insurers from offering EHBs in such a way as
to discriminate against individuals on the basis of age, disability, or life
expectancy.33 In a similar vein, insurers are prohibited from denying EHBs to
beneficiaries on the basis of age, life expectancy, present or predicted disability,
dependency, or quality of life.34
The ACA EHB requirement also aims to level the playing field of coverage
content between employment-based coverage and individual coverage, such that
those with employment-based insurance do not have a wider scope of coverage for
essential benefits than those who obtain insurance through the exchanges.35 The
EHB requirement provides that small group and individual insurers must ensure that
the essential benefits offered are equal in scope to those offered under a typical
employer plan.36
II. HIGH COSTS, ADVERSE SELECTION, AND THE ACA COVERAGE ACCESS
EXPANSION
If all of these ACA access expansion provisions applied equally inside and
outside the exchanges, then costs associated with increased access for high-risk
beneficiaries could be spread across the entire industry. However, the regulatory
structure of the ACA tends to treat some insurers differently than others, and as a
result, will tend to push high-risk beneficiaries into the individual exchanges.

27

Id. § 300gg-4(a).

28

Id. § 300gg-3(a).

29

Id. § 300gg-7.

30

Id. § 300gg-6(a).

31

Id. § 18022(b).

32

Id. § 18022(d).

33

Id. § 18022(b)(4)(B).

34

Id. § 18022(b)(4)(D).

35

Troy Oechsner & Magda Schaler-Haynes, Keeping it Simple: Health Plan Benefit
Standardization and Regulatory Choice Under the Affordable Care Act, 74 ALB. L. REV. 241,
290 (2011).
36

42 U.S.C.A. § 18022(b)(2)(A) (West 2010).
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Moreover, there are inherent structural weaknesses in the new health care delivery
system created under the ACA, creating a recipe for high costs and adverse selection.
A. High Costs and the Uneven Regulation of the Exchange Versus Non-Exchange
Markets
The uneven regulatory structure of the ACA is first found in the ACA’s more
stringent regulation of exchange plans compared to plans sold outside of the
exchange. This is not to say that the ACA does not attempt to level the playing field
between plans that are offered both inside and outside of the exchanges. For
example, as long as a single plan is being offered both inside and outside the
exchange, the insurer offering that single plan must treat the beneficiaries within that
plan as part of a single risk pool with the same premiums, whether they buy into the
plan inside or outside of the exchange.37 Beneficiaries inside and outside of the
exchange are also entitled to the same EHBs, provided they are not part of a selfinsured, large group, or grandfathered health plan.38 These prohibitions try to prevent
the insurance exchanges from becoming a dumping ground for costly high-risk
individuals.
Despite these efforts, there are still additional regulatory burdens that fall solely
upon the shoulders of exchange plans, allowing insurers who choose to offer
coverage solely outside of the exchanges to avoid the level playing field
requirements.39 Such additional regulatory burdens include requirements for provider
network adequacy, health care quality reporting, grievance procedures, marketing
practices, and benefit design.40 Comparatively lax regulations imposed on plans sold
outside of the exchanges allow those plans to design coverage to attract low-risk
beneficiaries, while driving costly high-risk beneficiaries into the exchanges.41
Moreover, even though the ACA requires that insurance plans, whether offered
inside or outside of the exchange, fall into one of four decreasing actuarial value
categories—platinum, gold, silver, or bronze42—a bronze plan sold inside the
37

Id. § 18032(c) (providing for the single risk pool requirement); Id. § 18021(a)(1)(C)(iii)
(2010) (requiring Qualified Health Plans to offer the same premium for a single plan
regardless of whether it is purchased inside or outside of the exchange). But see SARAH
LUECK, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, STATES SHOULD TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS TO
LIMIT ADVERSE SELECTION AMONG HEALTH PLANS IN THE EXCHANGE 4 (2011), available at
http://www.cbpp.org/files/6-28-11health.pdf (noting that it will be difficult to enforce the
single risk pool requirement).
38
42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-6(a) (West 2013); Stacey A. Torvino, All Illnesses are (Not)
Created Equal: Reforming Mental Health Insurance Law, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 8 (2012)
(noting that grandfathered plans, large group plans, and self-insured plans are excluded from
the EHB requirement).
39
Paul Westfall, Ethically Economic: The Affordable Care Act’s Impact on the
Administration of Health Benefits, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 99, 129 (2011) (explaining
how previous attempts at state-based health insurance exchanges led to cherry-picking, where
some insurers would offer cheaper plans outside of the exchanges, which would tend to attract
healthier enrollees, leaving the sickest enrollees to seek coverage through the exchanges).
40

LUECK, supra note 37, at 6.

41

Thomas L. Greaney, Regulating to Promote Competition in Designing Health Insurance
Exchanges, 20-SPG KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 237, 252 (2011).
42

42 U.S.C.A. § 18022(d) (West 2010).
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exchanges may look different than one sold outside the exchanges. No two bronze
plans need look alike, as long as actuarial equivalency requirements are met between
the two.43 Therefore, the insurer who only sells its bronze plan outside of the
exchange could manipulate the design of its bronze plan, such as the co-pay and
deductible structure, to attract less costly, low-risk beneficiaries.44
Some States may actually worsen the regulatory disparity between the exchange
insurance market and non-exchange insurance market. States are primarily
responsible for regulating the non-exchange insurance markets.45 Accordingly, they
could eliminate the disparities between the two markets by taking action to regulate
the non-exchange market to mirror the regulation of exchange market.46 However,
many States will not do so because they are politically opposed to health care
reform, including the exchanges. They view the exchanges as an overreach of federal
regulation that sacks the States with the costs of operating the exchanges.47 In fact,
as of May 2013, twenty-seven States have deferred to the federal government to set
up insurance exchanges in those States.48 There is fear that such opposition States
might sabotage the exchanges by failing to level the regulatory playing field,
refusing to enforce the ACA insurance reforms, and/or refusing to set up the risk
adjustment and reinsurance programs.49
B. High Costs Associated with Uneven Regulation of Individual Plans Versus Large
Group and Self-Insured Plans
Adverse selection and high costs within the individual exchanges are also likely
to occur because of differences in how the ACA regulates individual and small group
insurers versus large group and self-insured plans, particularly the latter.50 To
43

Greaney, supra note 41, at 250-51.

44

Id.

45

Sara Rosenbaum, Realigning the Social Order: The Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act and the U.S. Health Insurance System, 7 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 1, 28 (2011)
(noting that States retain their traditional regulatory role over insurance, but that the federal
regulatory power over insurance is expanded, particularly within the insurance exchanges).
46
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Commonwealth Fund, Health Insurance Exchanges and the
Affordable Care Act: Eight Difficult Issues, ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 27 (2011)
(arguing that States could keep costs down in the exchanges if they similarly regulate health
plans outside of the exchanges and/or are careful not to impose extra costs on exchange
plans).
47

Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Positive Case for Centralization in Health Care Regulation:
The Federalism Failures of the ACA, 20-SPG KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 266, 291-92 (2011)
[hereinafter Moncrieff, Centralization] (discussing the irony of State opposition to the
exchanges despite the ACA’s intent to provide States with flexibility in operating the
exchanges).
48
State Decisions for Creating Health Insurance Marketplaces, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND. (May 28, 2013), http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/health-insuranceexchanges.
49
Jost, supra note 46, at 13 (noting that State regulatory opposition to the exchanges could
lead to adverse selection and threaten the viability of the exchanges).
50
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 732-33 (1985) (explaining the
difference between insured and self-insured plans).
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illustrate the differences between how the ACA regulates these different insurance
markets, it is helpful to think of the ACA insurance reforms as applying to four
different insurance markets: self-insured plans; individual plans and small group
employment plans;51 grandfathered health plans; and large group plans. The ACA
most heavily regulates the individual and small group plans, especially those that are
sold within the exchanges.52 Large group employer plans are generally subject to
fewer ACA regulations and are regulated jointly by ERISA and State insurance
regulations.53 Self-insured plans are subject to even fewer ACA regulations than
large group employer plans, are exempt from State insurance regulation, and are
almost completely regulated by ERISA.54
As a result of these differing levels of regulation, some scholars contend that
large employers, especially self-insured employers, will engage in targeted dumping
of high-risk employees onto the individual exchanges, thereby creating an adverse
selection problem for the individual exchanges.55 Targeted dumping is likely to
occur because a number of consumer protection provisions that apply to individual
and small group plans do not apply to large employer plans and/or self-insured plans.
First, the ACA imposes only limited new coverage requirements upon selfinsured and large group plans, namely the requirements to cover clinical trials, to
cover preventive services without cost sharing, to limit out-of-pocket spending, and
to not impose annual or lifetime limits on coverage.56 These same new benefit
requirements also apply to individual and small group plans, but the individual and
small group plans are subject to additional requirements that do not apply to large
group fully-insured and self-insured plans, such as the EHB requirements,57 singlerisk pool requirement,58 and the prohibition against engaging in discriminatory
premium setting.59 Accordingly, compared to large group plans and self-insured
plans, small group and individual insurers, especially those within the exchanges, are
required to provide more comprehensive and non-discriminatory coverage, which is
more costly to provide and tends to attract high-risk enrollees.60
51
This market can technically be broken down into two sub-markets: individual and small
group plans sold inside the exchange, and individual and small group plans sold outside the
exchange.
52

Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1585 (2011).
53
Id. at 1592 (noting that after the ACA, the large group market will continue to be lightly
regulated by ERISA and HIPAA with fewer new ACA regulations impacting that market).
54

29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), b(2)(B) (2006); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990)
(interpreting ERISA to exempt self-insured plans from State regulation).
55

Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 12, at 128.

56

Id. at 147-48 (outlining the few specific ACA coverage mandates that apply to both the
individual market and the large group and self-insured plan markets).
57

42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-6(a) (West 2013).

58

Id. § 18032(c) (West 2010).

59

Id. § 18032(c).

60

JONATHAN GRUBER, COLORADO HEALTH BENEFIT EXCHANGE BACKGROUND RESEARCH
12-13 (2012), available at http://dailycaller.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Colorado_
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Second, two out of three of the ACA’s risk adjustment programs do not apply to
many large group plans and/or self-insured plans.61 The third risk adjustment
program, the permanent risk adjustment program, also excludes self-insured plans.62
As these programs operate to take away the incentive for targeting only risk
beneficiaries, self-insured plans and large group insurers have no incentive not to
dump their high-risk beneficiaries onto the exchanges and keep their low-risk
beneficiaries.63
Third, the ACA encourages large group and self-insured plans to dump high-risk
beneficiaries onto the exchange through the ACA wellness program provisions. As
long as certain strict requirements are met, the wellness provisions allow employers
to reward employees with premium and cost-sharing reductions, when they achieve
or maintain health goals, such as weight loss or a healthy BMI.64 The premium
reductions can be as high as thirty percent65 and employers can use such programs to
favor and reduce costs for low risk employees, while driving high-risk employees
onto the individual exchanges.66 While the ACA prohibits using these programs as a
subterfuge for discriminating against high-risk employees based on health status,
some scholars contend that it will be impossible to enforce this provision.67
Gruber_Jan_2012_NARRATIVE.pdf (predicting, within Colorado, that the EHB requirement
will drive up individual market insurance premiums by 5.3%); JILL S. HERBOLD & PAUL R.
HOUCHENS, INDIVIDUAL AND SMALL GROUP PREMIUM CHANGES UNDER THE ACA, 2 (2011),
available at http://www.in.gov/aca/files/Individual_SmallPremium_Increases.pdf (predicting,
within Indiana, that the EHB requirement will drive up premiums in the individual market by
20% to 30%); PEPER ET AL., supra note 17, at 21 (predicting, within Oregon, that the EHB
requirement will drive up premiums by 6% in the individual market); JENNIFER SMAGULA &
JONATHAN GRUBER, THE IMPACT OF THE ACA ON WISCONSIN’S HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET,
22 (2011), available at http://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/aboutdhs/docs/WI-Final-Report-July18-2011.pdf (predicting, within Wisconsin, that the EHB requirement will drive up individual
market insurance premiums by 6% to 7%).
61

42 U.S.C.A. § 18061-62 (West 2010) (applying the ACA’s temporary reinsurance and
risk corridor programs solely to the individual and small group markets).
62

Id. § 18063 (providing that “each State shall assess a charge on health plans and health
insurance issuers (with respect to health insurance coverage) . . . if the actuarial risk of the
enrollees of such plans or coverage for a year is less than the average actuarial risk of all
enrollees in all plans or coverage in such State for such year that are not self-insured group
health plans (which are subject to the provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974)”).
63

Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 12, at 151 (arguing that the “ACA largely excludes
employers, especially those that are self-insured, from the risk-sharing arrangements described
above that are designed to mute insurers’ incentives to attract comparatively healthy risks”).
64

Wendy K. Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility in Health Reform, 14
CONN. INS. L.J. 199, 214-17 (2008) (providing a summary of the ACA’s wellness program
provisions).
65

42 U.S.C.A § 300gg-4(j)(3)(A) (West 2010).

66

Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 12, at 169.

67

Id. (arguing that “the core problem [with enforcement] is that in order to incentivize
healthy living, a wellness program must provide benefits only to those who are, in fact,
healthier”).
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The contrast in ACA regulations applying to individual and small group plans
versus employment-based plans plainly provides a foundation and open invitation
for employers to engage in selective dumping of high-risk employees onto the
individual exchanges. Self-insured plans, even more than large group plans, are
likely to engage in selective dumping because of the complete absence of State
regulation and limited federal regulation.68 Unlike large group plans, self-insured
plans may also exacerbate adverse selection problems for the exchanges by gaming
the exchange system. More specifically, employers may choose to self-insure, design
plans that are low cost with thin coverage and remain that way as long as their health
care costs are low.69 Then, if and when their health care costs spike, they can fullyinsure and purchase through the exchange, if they are a small employer, or dump
their employees on the exchange, thereby flooding the exchange with high-risk
beneficiaries.70
While the world of self-insured plans may seem like a limited universe of large
employers, it is a growing universe.71 Small employers who self-insure no longer
need to worry about directly absorbing the impact of catastrophic claims, as a series
of court decisions have held that an employer can purchase stop-loss insurance with
a low attachment point72 and still remain self-insured for ERISA preemption
purposes.73 With the increasing trend towards small employers self-insuring, the
problem of selective dumping and accompanying adverse selection for the individual
exchanges may be larger than predicted.
C. Low-Risk Individuals Choosing Grandfathered Health Plans
Regulatory differences similarly arise when comparing individual exchange
plans to grandfathered health plans. Grandfathered plans are plans that existed as of
the date of the ACA’s enactment,74 and such plans are exempt from many of the
ACA’s consumer protection regulations. For purposes of this article, some of the
68

Id. at 159.

69

Jost, supra note 46, at 19-20.

70

Id.

71

Kathryn Linehan, Nat’l Health Pol’y Forum, Self-Insurance and the Potential Effects of
Health Reform on the Small-Group Market 1, 3 (2010), available at http://www.nhpf.org/
library/issue-briefs/IB840_PPACASmallGroup_12-21-10.pdf (noting that in 2009, 82.1% of
firms with 500 or more employees offered self-insured health plans, but only13.5% of firms
with fewer than 100 employees did so). Large employers choose to self-insure because they
can afford to cover the risk of directly insuring their employees.
72

CHRISTINE EIBNER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., EMPLOYER SELFINSURANCE DECISIONS & THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE
CARE ACT AS MODIFIED BY THE HEALTH CARE AND EDUCATION RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010
(ACA) 1, 93 (2011), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2011/LGHPstudy/
EmployerSIDACA.pdf (finding that 1/3 of small employers will self-insure if attachment
points are as low as $20,000). A low attachment point for triggering stop-loss insurance
largely shifts the risk to the stop-loss insurer.
73
Bill Gray Enters. v. Gourley, 248 F.3d 206, 209 (3d Cir. 2001); Thompson v. Talquin
Bldg. Prods., 928 F.2d 649, 653 (4th Cir. 1991); United Food & Commercial Workers v.
Pacyga, 801 F.2d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 1986).
74

42 U.S.C.A. § 18011 (West 2010).
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most relevant exclusions, include the requirement to provide EHBs, guaranteed issue
and renewability, the prohibition against discrimination based on health status, the
requirement to use modified community rating for premium setting, the requirement
to provide internal and external grievance procedures, and the requirement to
provide unimpeded access to emergency, pediatric, obstetric, and gynecological
care.75 Moreover, individual, but not group, grandfathered health plans can still use
pre-existing condition exclusions, longer waiting periods, and annual limits on
benefits.76
Significantly, grandfathered plans lose their grandfathered status if they make
certain changes to their plan content and/or structure that disadvantage their
enrollees.77 Because grandfathered plans are so restricted in the types of changes that
they can make and still keep their grandfathered status, it is believed that most, if not
all grandfathered plans will lose their status within a few years.78 Insurer efforts to
change cost-sharing or premiums are severely hampered by the grandfathered health
plan regulations, and therefore it will be hard for such plans to maintain their
grandfathered status, given likely medical technology changes, changes to the plan’s
pool of beneficiaries, and changes to the claims history of beneficiaries.79
Nonetheless, unless or until they disappear, grandfathered health plans will likely
cause adverse selection problems for the individual exchanges.
To the extent that grandfathered plans continue to exist, they may promote
adverse selection against the exchanges through lemon-dropping, or encouraging
high-risk beneficiaries to seek coverage in the individual exchanges, while keeping
low-risk beneficiaries within the grandfathered plan.80 Keeping only the low-risk
beneficiaries within the grandfathered plan also allows grandfathered plans to more
effectively avoid dealing with increasing insurance costs and having to change the
content or structure of their insurance plan with the possibility of losing their
grandfathered plan status. Many high-risk beneficiaries will not want to stay with
their grandfathered plans because such plans are likely to have thinner coverage than

75
Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Can You Really Keep Your Health Plan? The Limits of
Grandfathering Under the Affordable Care Act, 36 J. CORP. L. 753, 766-67 (2011) (outlining
the ACA exemptions for grandfathered plans).
76

Richard A. Epstein & Paula M. Stannard, Constitutional Ratemaking and the Affordable
Care Act: A New Source of Vulnerability, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 243, 247 (2012).
77
45 C.F.R. § 147.140 (2011) (providing that grandfathered health plans lose their status
if they change their scope of benefits, increase co-insurance percentages, increase fixedamount cost-sharing (other than co-payments) above medical inflation plus fifteen percentage
points, increase co-payments above five dollars plus medical inflation or medical inflation
plus fifteen percentage points, decrease the 2010 employer contribution rate by more than five
percent, add an annual limit on benefits where none existed in 2010, add an annual limit for a
plan that imposed only a lifetime limit, unless the annual limit is not less than the lifetime
limit, or lower annual limits for plans that had an annual limit in 2010).
78

Leonard, supra note 75, at 756 (arguing that most grandfathered plans will lose their
status because the can make changes only for the benefit of participants and only at the plan’s
expense).
79

Jost, supra note 46, at 18.

80

Id. at 13.
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individual exchange plans, as a result of the fewer regulations imposed on
grandfathered plans versus exchange-based plans.81
Alternatively, some plans with healthy risk pools will maintain grandfathered
plan status as long as their risk pool remains healthy, while other plans, with highrisk pools, will abandon grandfathered plan status ab initio.82 Beneficiaries in the
latter risk pools may immediately seek the likely comprehensive coverage available
within the individual exchanges. As a result, these healthy risk pools of individuals
will not be seeking coverage access through the individual exchanges, which would
otherwise help with risk spreading and avoiding adverse selection.
D. Young, Healthy Adults Avoiding the Individual Exchanges
The funneling of high-risk beneficiaries into the exchanges may also be
exacerbated by the ACA’s dependent coverage expansion, which allows parents to
keep their children on the family health insurance policy until the child reaches the
age of twenty-six.83 For those under the age of twenty-six without employmentbased insurance, the option may be more popular than purchasing insurance through
the exchanges, since there is little if any additional cost to the family to add a
dependent onto the family policy.84 For the individual exchanges, a failure of young
and healthy individuals to seek coverage through the individual exchanges poses a
risk selection problem. The incentive to choose the dependent coverage expansion
over exchange-based insurance will result in many young and healthy individuals
being carved out of the individual exchange risk pools.85 Accordingly, the individual
exchange risk pools will be disproportionately high-risk and exchange costs and
premiums will rise.86
E. Higher Administrative Costs Associated with the Exchanges
Not only will the exchanges potentially attract more high-risk beneficiaries than
low-risk beneficiaries, but the exchanges face additional costs that the non-exchange
markets do not face. The exchanges are required to be self-sustaining and there will
be administrative costs associated with running the exchanges.87 The exchanges are
expressly responsible for establishing eligibility for Medicaid and for premium tax
credits, contracting with navigators to educate and facilitate individual enrollment in
plans, operating a consumer hot line, hosting a consumer website with comparative
health plan information, rating exchange plans on quality and price and providing
consumers with a calculator for determining insurance costs.88 While these measures
81

Id.

82

Id. at 8.

83

42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-14(a) (West 2010).

84

Joel C. Cantor et al., Expanding Dependent Coverage for Young Adults: Lessons from
State Initiatives, 37 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 99, 122 (2012) (noting that the dependent
coverage expansion will be popular because “enrolling young adults in a parent’s plan will be
free, at the margin, for many families”).
85

Id. at 123.

86

Id.

87

Id. at 49.

88

42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(d)(4) (West 2010).
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are beneficial for beneficiaries, they also cost money and will likely drive up costs
within the exchanges. In past insurance exchanges, the exchanges merely dumped
their administrative costs on top of the exchange insurers’ administrative costs,
without attempting to reduce the latter.89
Someone has to pay for those costs and the States are unlikely to subsidize most
of these exchange costs.90 Accordingly, the exchanges may impose licensing, tax, or
regulatory fees upon insurers wishing to participate in the exchanges.91 However,
this means that providing insurance inside the exchange will be more expensive for
these insurers, or they will likely pass along those costs to consumers in the form of
higher premiums.92 The healthiest and least costly enrollees will likely avoid such
exchange plans and opt for plans with lower premiums outside of the exchange.93
Administrative costs within the exchanges will also be higher because of the
need to create new economies of scale. Insurers in the existing individual market for
health insurance have existing economies of scale in place.94 However, within the
individual exchanges, insurers have to build entirely new economies of scale by
building a whole new system of insurance, with additional administrative and
marketing costs.95 It seems likely that exchange insurers will also pass these costs
down to their beneficiaries through higher premiums and costs.
F. Market Share and Risk Pool Size
Market share size and risk pool size are also major cost concerns for the
individual exchanges. In the past, state-based insurance exchanges have had
difficulty attracting a sufficient number of beneficiaries to create the market share
necessary for exchange insurers to achieve economies of scale.96 Economies of scale
are necessary so that there is robust competition and the insurers can achieve
administrative cost savings and exercise sufficient bargaining power to drive down
89

Elliot K. Wicks & Mark A. Hall, Purchasing Cooperatives for Small Employers:
Performance and Prospects, 78 MILBANK QUARTERLY 4, 511-46 (2000).
90

Jost, supra note 46, at 49 (arguing that States are unlikely to reimburse the exchanges
for costs other than those associated with processing applications for State health care
programs, like Medicaid).
91

Jessica D. Allen, Note, A Way Forward: Establishing Financially Self-Sustaining
Health-Insurance Exchanges Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 98 IOWA
L. REV. 773, 793 (2013) (exploring the use of fees on exchange insurers as a method for
creating financially self-sustaining exchanges).
92

Jost, supra note 46, at 49.

93

Elliot K. Wicks, Cal. Healthcare Found., Building a National Insurance Exchange:
Lessons From California 3 (2009), available at http://www.chcf.org/~/media/MEDIA%20
LIBRARY%20Files/PDF/B/PDF%20BuildingANationalInsuranceExchange.pdf (explaining
that insurers do not like the head to head competition within exchanges for fear that if they
need to raise their premiums, the healthiest enrollees will just leave for a competitor plan).
94
Westfall, supra note 39, at 118 (discussing the economic problems with the ACA
insurance exchanges).
95

Id.

96

Wicks, supra note 93, at 3 (explaining that “an exchange is often just one health plan
loss away from failure”).
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prices.97 Moreover, without a sufficient number of beneficiaries, insurers lose
interest in joining the exchanges,98 especially if the exchange risk pool is comprised
mostly of premium subsidy beneficiaries.99 Such an exchange lacks the bargaining
power necessary to impose upon the participating insurers standards that will be
favorable to the beneficiaries.100 Insurers in such a situation can take more of a take
it or leave it attitude towards the exchanges.
A similar problem occurs if the insurance market within a State and within an
exchange in that State is dominated by a few large insurers, who act in a
monopolistic manner to undercut the bargaining power of the exchange.101 Whether
insurers lose interest in the exchange or whether the insurer market is highly
concentrated, an exchange without sufficient insurers for robust competition is an
exchange without bargaining power, a situation that will likely lead to higher costs
for exchange enrollees. Such an exchange will also likely have difficulty attracting
new insurers, who would otherwise increase competition and drive down prices
within the exchange.102Whether the lack of sufficient exchange plans is the result of
few beneficiaries or market concentration, the effect is a vicious circle. If an
insufficient number of plans—especially large plans—fail to join the exchanges,
then not enough people will want to enroll through the exchanges.103 Accordingly,
the incentive to buy through the exchanges will be reduced due to the lack of plan
choice, and as a result, insurer competition within the exchanges will be soft and
premiums may increase.104
Beneficiary pool size also has an impact on administrative costs. In terms of cost
spreading, a large pool of beneficiaries is necessary to keep per capita administrative
costs down. There are a number of fixed costs associated with the exchanges and
those costs will likely be passed onto enrollees.105 If there are fewer beneficiaries
within the exchanges, then the per capita costs will be higher.106
Small beneficiary pools can also lead to higher provider prices. Insurers contract
with networks of providers and are able to extract price concessions from those

97

Id.

98

Moncrieff, Centralization, supra note 47, at 293.

99

Jost, supra note 46, at 28 (arguing that “if the exchange is limited to individuals who
receive the premium tax credit, with few self-payers and small-employer participants, it will
be unattractive to insurers and will lack bargaining power”).
100

Id. (arguing that such an exchange will have an unattractive risk profile and will have
difficulty imposing minimum standards on plans joining the exchange).
101
Id. (arguing that exchanges will have difficulty imposing minimum standards in a
market dominated by three or fewer insurers).
102

Id.

103

Wicks, supra note 93, at 3.

104

Jost, supra note 46, at 16.

105

Id. at 16 (explaining that administrative efficiencies are only achieved if the personnel,
IT, publication, legal, rent and utility costs must be spread out over as many enrollees as
possible).
106

Id.
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providers, if the insurers can bring a large pool of patients to those providers.107
However, the insurer’s bargaining power to reduce prices is greatly diminished
where the pool of patients is small.108 As with administrative costs, those higher
provider prices are likely to passed along to beneficiaries in the form of higher
premiums or cost-sharing.
Finally, an insufficient number of beneficiaries also poses an adverse selection
problem. To avoid adverse selection, a stable exchange needs at least one hundred
thousand enrollees with seventy-five percent of the enrollees being non-Medicare
and non-Medicaid.109 Without a sufficiently diverse group of enrollees, risk
spreading and cost spreading is difficult, which, of course, leads to adverse
selection.110 Many small states with smaller risk pools may have difficulty
maintaining viable, diverse exchange risk pools and may need to join with other
States to create a sustainable exchange.111
G. State Run High-Risk Pool Dumping on the Individual Exchanges
Large employers and self-insured plans may not be the only ones engaging in
selective dumping on the exchange, as state-run high-risk pools may seek to dump
their beneficiaries on the exchange as quickly as possible. Prior to the ACA, a
number of states created high-risk pools for high-risk beneficiaries,112 but the
incentive to maintain such pools may be disappearing because of the operation of the
ACA temporary reinsurance program for the individual market.
The ACA’s temporary reinsurance program encourages state high-risk pools to
cease functioning for two reasons. First, HHS has promulgated a Rule that the state
high-risk pools are not eligible to receive any of the reinsurance money.113
Therefore, the state high-risk pools will want to dump their beneficiaries onto the
exchange, where insurers can use those beneficiaries to improve their eligibility for
reinsurance funds.114
107

Id. at 17.

108

Id.

109

ALAIN ENTHOVEN ET AL., COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., MAKING EXCHANGES WORK IN
HEALTH-CARE REFORM 7-8 (2009), available at http://www.allhealth.org/briefingmaterials/
MakingExchangesWorkinHealth-CareReform-1701.pdf (arguing that “an even larger size
[pool] is preferable from the point of view of economies of scale in administration of multiple
plans and overall market impact”).
110
Jost, supra note 46, at 17 (arguing that small risk pools are volatile and subject to
destabilization by a few large claims).
111

Moncrieff, Centralization, supra note 47, at 293-94 (citing West Virginia as an example
of a State that would need to create a regional exchange in order to avoid adverse selection
problems stemming from small risk pools).
112

NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, COVERAGE OF UNINSURABLE PREEXISTING CONDITIONS: STATE AND FEDERAL HIGH-RISK POOLS, available at
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/high-risk-pools-for-health-coverage.aspx (updated
Feb. 2013) (noting that from 1976 through 2009, 35 States set up high-risk pools enrolling
over 200,000 people).
113

42 C.F.R. §153.400(a)(2)(iii) (2013).

114

Brett Norman, States Rethink High-Risk-Pool Plans, POLITICO, (Jan. 29, 2013, 04:27
AM EST), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/states-rethink-high-risk-pools-exchanges-
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Second, if one state keeps many of its high-risk enrollees in a state-run high risk
pool, then the reinsurance assessments against insurers and self-insured plans in that
state are more likely to flow out of state to states that eliminated their high-risk pools
and dumped those beneficiaries onto their respective exchanges.115 The necessity for
quickly eliminating these State-run high-risk pools is enhanced by the fact that the
reinsurance payouts decrease over the three years of the temporary reinsurance
program.116
This sudden dumping phenomenon by the states could drive up costs and
insurance premiums within the individual exchanges.117 The individuals in state
high-risk pools are, by definition, the sickest of the sick and the costliest of the
costly. Accordingly, quickly dumping them en masse onto the exchanges could
cause exchange premiums to spike or make it difficult for exchange plans accepting
those enrollees to remain financially viable.
H. The Voluntary Medicaid Expansion and High Costs in the Individual Exchange
State action on Medicaid may also contribute to high costs within the individual
exchanges. First, a state’s failure to accept the ACA Medicaid expansion will likely
drive up individual exchange premiums within that state’s exchange.118 When
initially enacted, the ACA was supposed to expand Medicaid to those earning up to
133% of the Federal Poverty Level (“FPL”).119 However, the Supreme Court, in
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, ruled that the expansion is optional, not
mandatory for the States.120 In response, twenty-one States have chosen not to
expand Medicaid.121 Accordingly, within these States, those who fall under 133% of
86831.html (explaining that “the state high-risk pools may offload as many people as they can
onto the exchanges as soon as they open in 2014 or risk losing a piece of that $20 billion
pie”).
115

Id. (noting that Wisconsin is concerned that if it does not eliminate its State high-risk
pool quickly, then reinsurance assessments on Wisconsin insurers will flow to cover the cost
of high-cost plans in other States).
116

42 U.S.C.A. § 18061(b)(3)(B)(iii) (West 2010) (providing for $10 billion in reinsurance
payments in 2014, $6 billion in 2015, and $4 billion in 2016).
117
GRUBER, supra note 60, at 13 (predicting that folding the Colorado high-risk pool into
the exchange will cause Colorado individual market premiums to increase by 5.5%); HERBOLD
& HOUCHES, supra note 60, at 1 (predicting that merging the Indiana high-risk pool into the
individual market will drive up Indiana individual market premiums by 35% to 45%);
SMAGULA & GRUBER, supra note 60, at 22-23 (predicting that merging the Wisconsin highrisk pool into the individual market will drive up individual market premiums by 16%).
118
AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, IMPLICATIONS OF MEDICAID EXPANSION DECISIONS ON
PRIVATE COVERAGE 2 (Sept. 2012), available at http://www.actuary.org/files/Medicaid
_Considerations_09_05_2012.pdf (predicting that individual market premiums will go up by
at least 2% for States that reject the Medicaid expansion).
119

42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (West 2013).

120

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, at 2607-08 (2012).

121

Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND. (as of Dec. 11, 2013), http://kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/state-activity-aroundexpanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/.
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FPL will be forced to seek out insurance through the individual insurance
exchanges.122 While those under 100% of FPL will be unlikely to find any affordable
insurance, those between 100% and 133% of FPL will be heavily incentivized to
seek coverage through the individual exchanges because they are eligible for
premium subsidies.123
Exchange costs will likely increase if the exchanges are forced to absorb this
group, between 100% and 133% of FPL. First, this group is going to be a costly,
high-risk group with more complex medical problems.124 Second, because most of
these beneficiaries have been previously uninsured, they will aggressively seek out
health care now that they are insured and they will have higher initial claims costs.125
Third, if the ACA temporary reinsurance program, described infra, applies to these
beneficiaries, then the reinsurance amounts, which are fixed amounts per year,
would decrease per capita with the addition of this group, resulting in higher
premium rates for everyone else.126 Fourth, the fact that individuals with monthly or
yearly income variation will continuously churn between Medicaid eligibility and
exchange-based coverage or no coverage will also add to insurer costs.127 Exchange
insurers will likely have long term, instead of short term, added “risk premiums” to
account for both the early instability in the new market, as well as the persistent
uncertainty of churning.128 Churning also adds to insurer administrative costs as
insurers must continuously reestablish relationships with beneficiaries who have
churned in and out of exchange-based coverage.129 Moreover, churning makes it
more difficult to implement a permanent risk adjustment program, described infra,
that fully compensates insurers with disproportionate high-risk beneficiaries.130
Even in some States that agree to expand Medicaid, there is an effort underway
to shift the cost of covering these newly eligible individuals onto the individual
exchanges. For example, Arkansas is seeking an HHS waiver to purchase insurance
122

Emily Whelan Parento & Lawrence O. Gostin, Better Health, but Less Justice:
Widening Health Disparities After National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,
27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 481, 505-06 (2013).
123

Id.

124

AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 118, at 2.

125

CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, WHY A STATE’S HEALTH INSURERS SHOULD
SUPPORT EXPANDING MEDICAID 2 (SEPT. 2012), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/
medicaid-and-insurers-memo.pdf (arguing initial claims costs are higher for a group of
previously uninsured people versus those who are continuously insured).
126

AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 118, at 2-3.

127

An example of churning is when someone has sporadic jobs and their income varies
greatly from month to month, meaning that some months they are eligible for Medicaid and
other months they will be forced to obtain insurance through the exchanges or will have no
insurance at all in a non-Medicaid expansion State.
128

CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, supra note 125, at 2-3.

129

Id. at 3 (arguing that it will be difficult for insurers to manage chronic conditions as
beneficiaries churn between coverage and no coverage).
130

Id. (arguing that it will be difficult to implement an effective risk adjustment system
where a significant portion of a State’s population remains uninsured).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol62/iss1/5

18

2014]

IT’S A MISTAKE

93

from the individual exchanges for the newly eligible Medicaid population.131 Instead
of the state fully internalizing the cost of insuring these newly eligible beneficiaries,
the state is putting the burden on insurers within the individual exchange to provide
coverage and manage the cost of their care. Other states are considering following
suit.132
For the individual exchanges, this alternative Medicaid expansion proposal
drives up costs in a number of ways. First, this Medicaid group has a higher
morbidity rate, thereby driving up premiums, the cost of which must be covered by
either other exchange beneficiaries or by federal subsidies.133 Second, this group
increases the overall demand for care services, driving up provider reimbursement
demands, thereby leading to higher premiums.134 Third, as with the group of
beneficiaries between 100% and 133% of FPL, if the ACA temporary reinsurance
program applies to these Medicaid beneficiaries, then the per capita reinsurance
amounts would decrease per capita, resulting in higher premium rates for everyone
else.135
I. The ACA’s Attempt to Push Back Against Adverse Selection and High Costs within
the Individual Exchanges
To some extent the ACA implements measures designed to avoid adverse
selection and high cost problems. For example, the individual mandate aims to
eliminate adverse selection by requiring most individuals to either purchase
insurance or pay a tax penalty, with certain exemptions.136 The point of the
individual mandate is to push healthy individuals into the individual insurance
market, so that adverse selection is less likely to occur.137 The individual mandate
spreads the risk, as the healthy individuals pay more in premiums than they spend on
health care, thereby cross-subsidizing high-risk beneficiaries and preventing adverse

131

Sara Rosenbaum, HealthReformGPS, Using Medicaid Funds to Buy Qualified Health
Plan Coverage for Medicaid Beneficiaries (2013) available at http://www.healthreformgps.
org/wp-content/uploads/SR-Arkansas-premium-support-pdf.pdf.
132
Julie Piotrowski, Health Affairs, Premium Assistance in Medicaid, HEALTH POL’Y BRIEF
3 (2013), available at http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief
_94.pdf (reporting that Tennessee, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Florida are considering a similar
plan).
133
ROBERT M. DAMLER ET AL., MILLIMAN, CONSIDERATIONS FOR MEDICAID EXPANSION
THROUGH HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGE COVERAGE 5 (2013), available at http://
publications.milliman.com/publications/healthreform/pdfs/considerations-for-medicaidexpansion.pdf (noting that the “morbidity difference between those with incomes below 138%
of FPL may be 15% to 25% greater than those with incomes in the range of 138% to 300% of
FPL”).
134

Id. at 4.

135

Id. at 5.

136

See generally 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (Westlaw 2010).

137

Oechsner & Schaler-Haynes, supra note 35, at 282-83 (explaining that the individual
mandate prevents healthy individuals from gaming the system by waiting until they get sick to
purchase insurance).
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selection.138For several reasons, the individual mandate may not be as powerful in
fighting adverse selection and tamping down costs as first appears. First, the
mandate penalty is not that much of a “big stick” in terms of a penalty, at least not
until 2016. In 2014, the mandate penalty is the greater of $95 per person or 1% of
your income above the income tax filing limit, and $395 per person or 2% of your
income above the income tax filing limit in 2015.139 Even when fully implemented,
in 2016, the mandate penalty is the greater of $695 per person or 2.5% of your
income above the income tax filing limit.140 These penalties may not be strong
enough to incentivize healthy people to purchase insurance.141 Individuals value
losses more than they value gains, so they are more willing to forego the penalty and
pay for the value of insurance, only if the penalty is high enough.142
Moreover, for at least some people, the delta between the penalty amount and the
cost of insurance is large, with the insurance plan costing much more than the
penalty. The average premium cost for a bronze level exchange plan could be
between $4,500 and $5,000 per year,143 whereas someone earning a little over
$50,000 per year faces a 2.5% penalty or roughly $1,000,144 a delta of $4,000 or
more. If such a moderate income individual is healthy, they face a low incentive to
pay an extra $4,000 or more to buy insurance and avoid the penalty.145 When the
penalties are low compared to the cost of insurance, healthy non-risk-averse people
will be willing to forgo insurance and pay the penalty.
For others, there is absolutely no penalty-based incentive to purchase insurance.
These individuals will be exempt from the mandate because the annual cost of the
lowest cost bronze level plan is more than 8% of their annual income, after taking
138

Amy B. Monahan, On Subsidies and Mandates: A Regulatory Critique of ACA, 36 J.
CORP. L. 781, 787 (2011).
139

26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(c) (Westlaw 2010).

140

Id.

141

Oechsner & Schaler-Haynes, supra note 35, at 284; PEPER ET AL., supra note 17, at 28
(predicting, in Oregon, that premium rates in the individual market will increase by an average
of 15% because people with high morbidity are more likely to purchase insurance than those
who are young and healthy). But see Baker, supra note 52, at 1615-21 (arguing that the
individual mandate penalty is strong enough to encourage sufficient participation to avoid
adverse selection problems, and even if there is adverse selection, the exchanges will remain
sustainable).
142
Monahan, supra note 138, at 796-97 (arguing that individuals value losses more highly
than gains and are more likely to buy insurance and gain the value of insurance, than pay a
high penalty).
143
DAVID NEWMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INDIVIDUAL MANDATE AND RELATED
INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS UNDER PPACA 1, 7 n.25 (2011), available at http://
healthreformgps.org/wpcontent/uploads/CRSreportonPPACAug2011.pdf
(projecting
the
annual bronze level plan premium to be $4,800 per year); Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf,
Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Senator Olympia Snowe (Jan. 11, 2010), available at http://
www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/108xx/doc10884/01-11-premiums_
for_bronze_plan.pdf (estimating the average annual bronze level premium to be between
$4,500 and $5,000 per year).
144

This accounts for a roughly $10,000 income tax filing limit.

145

Monahan, supra note 138, at 796-97.
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into account any premium assistance tax credits.146 Taking into account the projected
costs of bronze level plans, this means that some individuals earning 250% of FPL to
approximately 500% of FPL could be exempt from the mandate because insurance
would be unaffordable to them.147 Healthy individuals within that group, who have
low expected health care costs may very well choose not to pay thousands of dollars
a year for insurance.148 There is no downside for them because they are exempt from
the mandate penalty.
The ACA attempts to push this low-risk group into the individual exchanges by
limiting enrollment to one annual exchange enrollment period, with an exception for
changes in status, such as losing a job.149 The limited enrollment period is supposed
to incentivize low-risk individuals to not game the system and wait until they get
sick to obtain exchange-based coverage because it will not be easy to enter market.
Still, some with non-emergent and non-chronic illness, like a future need for knee
replacement surgery, may still game the system. They may initially pay the penalty,
purchase insurance when they are ready to have their surgery, and then drop the
insurance and pay the penalty again after their health care crisis passes.150 The choice
of these otherwise healthy individuals to pay the penalty and then game the exchange
system causes the exchanges to become heavily weighted with high-risk
beneficiaries.151
The ACA also uses three risk adjustment programs to prevent some insurers from
cherry picking good risks, while other insurers get stuck with all of the high-risk
enrollees, creating adverse selection problems.152 Two of the three risk adjustment
programs are temporary. The first program applies in 2014, 2015, and 2016 and is a
reinsurance program for insurers in the individual market.153 The program imposes
assessments on insurers and administrators for self-insured plans, and then uses
those funds as reinsurance for insurers who insure high-risk enrollees.154
The second program also covers the years 2014 through 2016 in the form of a
risk corridor program for exchange plans.155 The program sets a target amount for
annual insurer claims costs and if an insurer’s claims costs come in under that
amount by 3% or more, then the insurer must pay some of that money to the
146

26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(e)(1)(A) (Westlaw 2010).

147

Monahan, supra note 138, at 788-91.

148

Id. at 792.

149

42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(c)(6) (Westlaw 2010).

150

Epstein & Stannard, supra note 76, at 254 (criticizing burdensome ACA regulations for
allowing healthy individuals to strategically enter and leave the exchange market, thereby
driving adverse selection).
151

Id.

152

Baker, supra note 52, at 1614 (explaining that these programs shift funds between
insurers, such that the enrollee is really paying his or her fair share of premiums as part of a
larger pool of many insurers, rather than paying premiums based on the limited risk pool of
that enrollee’s insurer).
153

42 U.S.C.A. § 18061 (West 2010).

154

Id.

155

Id. § 18062.
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government.156 In turn, if an insurer’s claims costs are 103% of the target number or
higher, then the government uses the money paid into the program to provide
reinsurance to those insurers for those excess costs.157
The permanent risk adjustment program authorizes states to assess a charge
against all individual and small group insurers, other than self-insured plans, who
tend to have enrollees with a lower than average actuarial risk, and to shift those
funds to individual and small group insurers, other than self-insured plans, who tend
to have enrollees with higher than average actuarial risk.158 The program provides
financial assistance for insurers who end up with high-risk enrollees, while
penalizing those who would try to cherry pick low-risk beneficiaries.
There are concerns that these three programs will not be effective. First, risk
adjustment technology is new and tends to under-predict the costs of high-risk
enrollees and over-predict the costs of low-risk enrollees.159 At best, risk adjustment
programs only assist in reducing the cost differences between multiple plans, and in
the case of the ACA risk adjustment programs, the ability to do so is weak, given the
lack of existing data to compare the risks of beneficiaries across plans.160
Second, assuming states cooperate in developing risk adjustment systems, they
may have difficulty in collecting the data necessary to develop an effective risk
adjustment system, especially the data needed from non-exchange insurers.161
Moreover, insurers may have a hard time collecting data to assess risk for short-term
beneficiaries, who are only on the exchange for a brief time period, as a result of job
changes or Medicaid churning.162
Third, insurers have demonstrated a history of evading risk adjustment programs
and continuing to cherry pick good risks, while trying to stick other insurers with
poor risks. For example, similar to the ACA exchange provisions, Part D includes
protections against adverse selection, such as risk adjustment, reinsurance and risk
corridors.163 Despite these preventive measures some Part D plans have been able to
structure plan designs to lure in healthier, low-risk enrollees and drive away costlier,
high-risk enrollees.164 A similar situation occurred with Medicare Advantage.165
156

Id.

157

Id.

158

Id. § 18063(a).

159

CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, DESIGNING A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE 27
(2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7697/1208-medicare.pdf (explaining that overprediction and underprediction cost errors can cause
premiums to rise in plans that attract high-risk enrollees); Baker, supra note 52, at 1614-15
(explaining that the risk adjustment programs’ success depends on advancements in risk
adjustment technology).
160

LUECK, supra note 37, at 3-4.

161

Jost, supra note 46, at 15.

162

Id.

163
LUECK, supra note 37, at 3 (drawing an analogy between adverse selection in the
Medicare Part D program, Medicare Advantage program, and Federal Employees Health
Benefits Program and the likely adverse selection to occur within the health insurance
exchanges).
164

Id.
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There is no reason why the same thing would not occur with regard to the
exchanges, except that adverse selection may occur not only among plans within the
exchanges, but may also occur between insurers inside the exchange and insurers
outside the exchange.166
Insurance brokers may even assist insurers in evading the risk adjustment
programs. Brokers make money off of commissions, so they will direct consumers to
wherever their commissions are going to be highest.167 If a broker is not getting a
commission or a sufficient commission from exchange business, then he or she will
not direct business toward the exchange or will engage in “street underwriting” in
which the broker moves high-cost business to the exchanges and low-cost business
outside of the exchanges.168 There is a history of insurance brokers undermining
insurance exchanges because of the lack of exchange commissions or poorly
structured exchange commissions.169
Finally, the fact that premium subsidies and cost-sharing reductions for lowincome beneficiaries are only offered through the exchanges170 also appears to fight
adverse selection. To the extent that these lower income beneficiaries are healthy and
low-risk, the ACA subsidies encourage this group of healthy consumers to buy
insurance through the individual exchanges, thereby promoting risk spreading.171
However, if those who tend to qualify for these subsidies tend to fall more into the
high-risk category, then the use of exchange-based subsidies only further
incentivizes these high-risk individuals to migrate toward the individual exchanges,
thereby driving up exchange costs.
III. MANAGED CARE IN THE EXCHANGES
A. Why and How Insurers Might Fight Back Against High Exchange Costs
Adverse selection and high costs are very real and serious threats to the viability
of the exchanges. The question and part of the focus of this article is what will be the
response to these adverse selection and high cost concerns. Many have focused on
possible federal and state government responses to save the exchanges from adverse
selection and high costs.172 However, the focus of this article is on the insurer’s
165

Id. at 8 (explaining how Medicare Advantage plans upcoded enrollees’ health risk in
order to qualify for high risk adjustment payments).
166

Westfall, supra note 39, at 118 (arguing that exchange insurers may engage in “cream
skimming,” or competing for the healthiest enrollees, instead of competing on the basis of
quality and efficiency).
167

Id. at 118.

168

Jost, supra note 46, at 52.

169

Wicks & Hall, supra note 89, at 538

170

26 U.S.C.A. § 36B (West 2010); 42 U.S.C.A. § 18071 (West 2010).

171
Westfall, supra note 39, at 130-131 (arguing that subsidies encourage low-risk enrollees
to participate in the exchange, encourage risk-sharing across types and can offset the price
effects of adverse selection).
172
Letter from John E. Dicken, Dir. Health Care, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, to E.
Benjamin Nelson, Chairman, Subcomm. on the Legislative Branch, Comm. on
Appropriations, U.S. Senate (Feb. 25, 2011), available at http://www.worldcat.org/title/
private-health-insurance-coverage-expert-views-on-approaches-to-encourage-voluntary-

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014

23

98

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:75

response, especially efforts to promote managed care and related cost cutting
measures.
The potential for adverse selection and high costs within the exchanges begs for
insurers to take action to restrain such costs, assuming insurers see a potential
profitable market in the individual exchanges and seek to tap into that market. While
managed care may be unpopular with consumers and providers173 and may not be the
panacea to resolve any and all cost problems in the individual exchanges, insurers
will likely attempt to use managed care-type tools to address these cost problems.
After all, managed care has a proven track record of controlling costs and decreasing
spending, without having a negative impact on quality health care.174 As long as the
individual exchange insurers adopt managed care tools, as a whole group, they avoid
creating an adverse selection problem among themselves and may be able to repeat
past managed care cost control successes.175
While some maintain that managed care is dead as a result of State Patients Bill
of Rights laws,176 such is not the case.177 Instead, managed care merely changed its
form, such that it “broadened provider networks, reduced physician risk-sharing,
introduced new incentives under the rubric of pay-for-performance, relaxed
gatekeeping, and focused utilization review on high cost items.”178 Perhaps in
enrollment-letter-to-e-benjamin-nelson-chairman-subcommittee-on-the-legislative-branchcommittee-on-appropriations-united-states-senate/oclc/716123472?referer=di&ht=edition
(GAO study outlining alternatives to the individual mandate that could have been used to
encourage healthy individuals to purchase insurance had the mandate been struck down);
Greaney, supra note 41, at 237 (arguing for the exchanges to be open to larger employers to
diversify the risk pool); Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 12, at 125 (outlining statutory and
regulatory solutions to level the playing field between exchange-based coverage and large
group and self-insured coverage); Oechsner & Schaler-Haynes, supra note 35, at 241 (arguing
for equal regulation of insurance plans both inside and outside of the exchanges to battle
adverse selection).
173
Barbara J. Zabawa et al., Adopting Accountable Care Through the Medicare
Framework, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1471, 1486 (2012) (explaining that providers oppose
managed care because they lose control over patient care and suffer from lower
reimbursement and patients oppose managed care because they believe that managed care cost
cutting is tantamount to denial of access to necessary care).
174

Robert F. Rich & Christopher T. Erb, The Two Faces of Managed Care Regulation and
Policy Making, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233, 237-39 (2005) (finding that the literary
consensus is that managed care reduced the rate of health care cost growth without evidence
of a clear negative impact on health care quality).
175

Gail B. Agrawal, Resuscitating Professionalism: Self-Regulation in the Medical
Marketplace, 66 MO. L. REV. 341, 375-76 (2001) (noting that it is important that insurers
collectively promote managed care or otherwise they create their own adverse selection
problems, as only low-risk enrollees seek out coverage through a managed care insurer, while
high-risk enrollees enroll in more traditional insurance plans).
176

Zabawa et al., supra note 173, at 1486-87 (detailing how State Patients Bill of Rights
laws watered down managed care).
177

Marc A. Rodwin, The Metamorphosis of Managed Care: Implications for Health
Reform Internationally, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 352, 359 (2010) (citing scholarly claims that
managed care is dead, but declaring that the obituary is premature).
178

Id.
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response to the provider and patient backlash against utilization management and
review, capitation and gatekeeping, MCOs became more sophisticated, subtle, and
less blunt in their efforts to control costs, but they still engaged in such efforts.179
These revised MCOs still successfully found ways to reduce costs and improve the
quality of care, despite obstacles from the managed care backlash of the 1990s.180
Moreover, managed care is alive and well today in many different contexts. Of
those receiving employment based insurance, 16% are still enrolled in HMOs, with
another 65% enrolled in revised forms of managed care, either preferred provider
organizations (“PPOs”) or point of service (“POS”) plans.181 Managed care is
thriving and growing even more in the Medicaid world, where, as of 2011, over 74%
of Medicaid enrollees were enrolled in managed care plans in the United States.182
Likewise, in Medicare, in 2012, 27% of all Medicare enrollees were enrolled in
Medicare Part C, the managed care version of Medicare.183
B. Managed Care’s Perseverance and New Tools for Controlling Costs in the
Exchanges
Insurer managed care efforts will certainly face obstacles within the exchanges.
For example, the exchange-based network adequacy requirement184 will interfere
with insurers’ ability to develop restricted networks. Likewise, the ACA requirement
that group health plans and insurers offer extensive internal and external grievance
reviews185 also hinders the ability of insurers to engage in strict utilization
management and review.
Nonetheless, managed care has demonstrated a history of perseverance and
survival despite obstacles. In the past, managed care revamped its tools to achieve
cost cutting goals in new ways. As discussed supra, managed care found ways to
avoid risk adjustment measures in Medicare Parts C and D. Managed care also
extorted loopholes in statutes and regulations, such as State laws that restrict
capitation, but fail to precisely define what capitation is prohibited.186
179

Linda Peeno, The Second Coming of Managed Care, 40-MAY TRIAL 18 (2004)
(providing examples of the new ways that managed care controls costs, such as disease
management programs, pseudo-scientific clinical practice guidelines, use of tiered benefits,
and providers and physician profiling).
180

Zabawa et al., supra note 173, at 1489.

181

GARY CLAXTON ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS:
2012 ANNUAL SURVEY 68 (2012), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.
com/2013/03/8345-employer-health-benefits-annual-survey-full-report-0912.pdf.
182

Medicaid Managed Care Enrollees as a Percent of State Medicaid Enrollees, HENRY J.
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (as of July 1, 2011), http://www.statehealthfacts.org/
comparemaptable.jsp?ind=217&cat=4.
183
Medicare Advantage Fact Sheet, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (2012),
http://kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/medicare-advantage-fact-sheet/.
184

42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(c)(1)(B) (West 2010).

185

Id. § 300gg-19(b).

186
Mark A. Hall, The Death of Managed Care: A Regulatory Autopsy, 30 J. HEALTH POL.
POL’Y & L. 427, 434 (2005) (finding that few states implemented guidelines regarding what
sort of capitation agreements are prohibited and only one state took any enforcement actions
against managed care insurers).
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Moreover, some of the ACA’s anti-managed care provisions are not as strong as
they may seem. For example, the ACA’s external review requirement may not have
much teeth. Under ERISA, courts grant insurers a highly deferential standard of
review when the ERISA plan design grants the plan great discretion in its coverage
decisions.187 The same thing could happen with the ACA internal and external
grievance requirements.
At this early stage in the development of exchanges, it is difficult to predict how
insurers will attempt to control costs within the health insurance exchanges, but one
possibility is to promote or facilitate the growth of ACA endorsed delivery reform
measures that mirror managed care.188 For example, the Medicare Accountable Care
Organization (“ACO”) demonstration project calls for the creation of ACO entities
comprised of providers and hospitals that are held jointly accountable for delivering
low cost and high quality care to their Medicare patients.189 The ACO providers still
get paid on a fee-for-service basis, but, depending on the ACO model chosen,
Medicare will pay the ACO bonuses and levy penalties against them based on their
ability to reduce Medicare spending while maintaining or improving care quality.190
Unlike traditional managed care, the cost accountability and risk falls upon the
providers instead of the insurers, but, the payer, through setting cost and quality
standards, is still indirectly managing spending, managing care, and eliminating
wasteful and unnecessary care.191 The similarity between ACOs and managed care is
even closer where the ACO operates under a fully capitated system.192 ACOs are
already growing like gangbusters, especially in the private sector.193
Somewhat similar to the ACOs, the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement
Initiative uses a quasi-capitated payment system to incentivize providers to cut costs
and deliver high quality care.194 Though there are different bundled payment models,
the general approach is for Medicare and a group of providers to set a target bundled
cost for all of the care associated with an episode of care surrounding a given

187
Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 375 (2002) (holding that courts
will be highly deferential to ERISA plan coverage decisions where the plan design provides
the plan with unfettered discretion in benefit determinations).
188
Lawton Burns & Mark Pauly, Accountable Care Organizations May Have Difficulty
Avoiding the Failures of Integrated Delivery Networks of the 1990s, HEALTH AFFAIRS 31, no.
11, at 2407, 2407 (Nov. 2012), available at http://d1c25a6gwz7q5e.cloudfront.net/papers/
download/12042012_BurnsPaulyACOsAppendix3.pdf (explaining that ACOs are growing in
the private sector).
189

42 U.S.C.A. § 1395jjj(b)(1)-(2) (West 2010).

190

42 C.F.R. § 425.600-08 (2011).

191

Jessica Mantel, Accountable Care Organizations: Can We Have Our Cake & Eat It
Too?, 42 SETON HALL. L. REV. 1393, 1410-11 (2012).
192

Id. at 1411.

193

David Muhlestein, Continued Growth of Public & Private Accountable Care
Organizations, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Feb. 19, 2013), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/
02/19/continued-growth-of-public-and-private-accountable-care-organizations/ (finding, as of
2012, over 150 private sector ACOs).
194

42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc-4 (West 2010).
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hospitalization.195 The providers involved in that episode of care will continue to be
paid by Medicare on a fee-for-service basis, but their total reimbursement will be
measured against the target costs.196 If they generate savings against the targeted
costs, they share in those savings, but if they generate losses, then they must repay
some of their reimbursement to Medicare.197 The system is very much like a
managed care capitated payment system198 with one of the bundled payment models
being fully capitated.199
The Patient-Centered Medical Home takes on a different aspect of managed care,
the gatekeeper-like role of primary care providers.200 Under the PCMH or Advanced
Primary Care Practice (“APCP”) demo, Medicare will pay primary care providers an
additional fee to coordinate a patient’s care with other providers, manage the
patient’s overall health, monitor the patient’s health, and provide general oversight
over the patient over the continuum of care.201 Although patients in the APCP
program are not required to obtain the primary care provider’s permission to see
specialists, the primary care provider is still financially incentivized to regulate,
monitor, control, and oversee the patient’s complete care. Many large private
insurers are already testing medical home models outside of Medicare.202
Initially, insurers may be forced to use incentives to promote the spread of these
reforms until these delivery reforms fully expand beyond Medicare and Medicaid
demo programs and reach a tipping point of acceptance. However, eventually,
assuming network adequacy requirements are met, exchange insurers may require
that contracting providers agree to operate as ACOs, PCMHs, or be willing to accept
bundled payments in order to be providers within the insurer’s network. The
question is whether insurers can use these new models and other managed care-type
tools to cut costs effectively or whether they will be stymied in their efforts.

195

Id. § 1395cc-4(c).

196

Fact Sheet: Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS. (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/
Fact-Sheets/2014-Fact-sheets-items/2014-01-30-2.html.
197

Id.

198

Jeffrey Hammond, Cash Only Doctors: Challenges & Prospects of Autonomy and
Access, 80 UMKC L. REV. 307, 311 n.23 (2011) (explaining that placing the provider at risk
for providing treatment for a set amount of money is akin to managed care capitation).
199

Fact Sheet, supra note 196.

200

Peter Kalis & Judy Hlafcsak, Healthcare Reform: Let’s Act Locally, 50 DUQ. L. REV.
253, 265-66 (2012) (comparing the medical home model to HMOs).
201

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &MEDICAID SERVICES, MULTI-PAYER ADVANCED PRIMARY CARE
PRACTICE (MAPCP) DEMONSTRATION FACT SHEET (Apr. 5, 2012), available at http://
innovation.cms.gov/Files/fact-sheet/mapcpdemo-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
202

Alexandria Ottens, There’s No Place Like Home: Moving Towards Patient-Centered
Medical Homes for Healthcare Reform, 20 ANNALS HEALTH L. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 1, 4
(2011) (noting that United Health Care, Aetna, and Blue Cross/Blue Shield are all testing
medical homes).
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IV. ERISA PREEMPTION AND THE EXCHANGES
A. Managed Care Tort Liability
Beyond the consumer protection obstacles embodied within state-based Patients
Bill of Rights laws and certain ACA provisions, such as the network adequacy
requirements and internal/external grievance process requirements, the lack of
ERISA preemption for individual exchange insurers poses another difficult obstacle
for managed care and cost cutting efforts within the individual exchanges.
Historically, when insurers adopt aggressive cost cutting measures that result in
patient injury, patients have tried to sue their insurer under State tort law
principles.203 More specifically, patients have sued their insurers successfully under
a variety of liability theories, including apparent agency,204 actual agency,205 and
corporate negligence.206
A well-known example of the application of apparent and actual agency liability
to a managed care organization (“MCO”) is Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of
Illinois, Inc.207 In Petrovich, the plaintiff sued various treating doctors and her HMO
for medical malpractice after her doctors negligently failed to diagnose her oral
cancer.208 Although the doctors were independent contractors of the HMO, the
Illinois Supreme Court held that the HMO could be held liable for the doctors’
medical malpractice, provided the HMO held itself out as the provider of care
without informing the patient that she was receiving care from an independent
contractor doctor and provided the patient was seeking care from the HMO and not a
specific doctor.209 The Court further held that there was a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the HMO exerted sufficient control over the doctors involved to

203

Christopher Smith, Between the Scylla and Charybdis: Physicians and the Clash of
Liability Standards and Cost Cutting Goals Within Accountable Care Organizations, 20
ANNALS HEALTH L. 165, 174-75 (2011).
204
E. Haavi Morreim, High-Deductible Health Plans: New Twists on Old Challenges from
Tort & Contract, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1208 (2006) (noting that as managed care exerted
more control over financial and medical decisions for patients, they were more subject to
liability through corporate negligence and ostensible authority theories).
205

Gail B. Agrawal & Mark A. Hall, What if You Could Sue Your HMO? Managed Care
Liability Beyond the ERISA Shield, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 235, 244 (2003) (noting that States
expanded the reach of implied authority liability to MCOs where there was sufficient control
of affiliated independent contractor doctors).
206

Emmanuel O. Iheukwumere, Application of the Corporate Negligence Doctrine to
Managed Care Organizations: Sound Public Policy or Judicial Overkill?, 17 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 585, 613 (2001) (noting that staff model MCOs, like hospitals, have the
same duty to select and retain competent healthcare providers, to maintain safe and adequate
facilities and equipment for enrollees when the MCOs provide direct medical care, to oversee
all who practice under their influence and control and to ensure that enrolled providers
formulate, adopt and enforce adequate rules to ensure quality care).
207

Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Ill., Inc., 719 N.E.2d 756 (Ill.1999).
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Id. at 760.
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Id. at 768.
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create an actual agency relationship, given the HMO’s capitation method for paying
the doctors and its quality assurance review over the doctors.210
An example of corporate negligence in the MCO context is Jones v. Chicago
HMO, in which an overburdened HMO staff doctor was unavailable to personally
examine a sick child and negligently failed to diagnose and treat the child’s
meningitis.211 The Illinois Supreme Court held that the HMO could be held liable for
the child’s resulting brain damage through corporate negligence.212 The Court ruled
that the plaintiff could prevail on a corporate negligence theory by proving that the
HMO assigned an excessive number of patients to the HMO staff doctor, thereby
overburdening the provider and indirectly resulting in the patient’s injury.213
B. ERISA Preemption of State Tort Suits Against Managed Care
Despite plaintiffs’ general success in suing HMOs under various tort doctrines,
when a plaintiff sues his employment-based MCO for cost cutting that leads to
patient harm, ERISA preemption of state tort law prohibits such plaintiffs from
recovering from their insurer.214 The Supreme Court’s interpretation of ERISA, as
applied to employment-based health plans, has rendered almost all such plans
immune from state tort suits.215 Accordingly, ERISA preemption has an impact on a
large number of potential plaintiffs, as presently, almost sixty percent of non-elderly
Americans receive their health insurance through their employers.216
ERISA was passed in 1974 with the goal of providing uniform federal regulation
of employee welfare and benefits plans, so that large employers were not subject to
the vagaries of fifty different state welfare and benefits laws.217 Hence the strong
federal preemption measures within ERISA, which are twofold in nature. First,
210

Id. at 774-75.

211

Jones v. Chi. HMO Ltd. of Ill., 730 N.E.2d 1119, 1123 (Ill. 2000).

212

Id. at 1128.

213

Id. at 1132; see also Shannon v. McNulty, 718 A.2d 828 (Pa. Super. 1998) (holding that
corporate negligence principles apply to HMOs where an HMO influences the delivery of
health care and attempts to limit patient access to treatment).
214
Peter Jacobson, Who Killed Managed Care? A Policy Whodunit, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
365, 381 (2003) (noting the generally unsuccessful patient State law challenges against
ERISA plans for injury due to delayed or denied care or MCO financial incentives to
providers to limit care).
215
Schapiro, supra note 2, at 46-47 (noting that the Supreme Court has interpreted ERISA
to preempt State law claims against HMOs without providing a federal substitute remedy).
216

JULIE SONIER ET AL., STATE HEALTH ACCESS DATA ASSISTANCE CTR., STATE LEVEL
TRENDS IN EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS 3 (Apr.
2013), available at http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/reports/2013/rwjf405434
(finding that 59.5% of non-elderly Americans had employer-sponsored coverage in 2010 and
2011).
217
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142
(1990) (holding that the purpose of ERISA was “to ensure that plans and plan sponsors would
be subject to a uniform body of benefits law; the goal was to minimize the administrative and
financial burden of complying with conflicting directives among States or between States and
the Federal Government”).
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Section 514 of ERISA supersedes any state law that relates to employee benefit
plans.218 However, Section 514 preemption is not complete as the “savings” clause
of Section 514 saves from federal preemption any state law that regulates
insurance.219 In other words, if a state law relates to employee benefit plans, but is
also a regulation of insurance, then the state law is saved from preemption.
Nonetheless, even a “saved” state law, as applied to self-insured plans, is further
preempted by ERISA through the “deemer clause” of Section 514.220 The “deemer
clause” deems self-insured plans to be preempt from any and all state laws regulating
employee benefits, even if the applicable law also regulates insurance.221
Second, even if Section 514 does not preempt a given state law, Section 502 of
ERISA may still preempt the state law at issue. With regard to a wrongful denial of
benefits, Section 502 provides for exclusive ERISA federal causes of action against
an ERISA plan fiduciary for breaches of fiduciary duties owed to the plan and for
other appropriate equitable relief.222 The Supreme Court has interpreted this
provision to fall under the complete preemption exception to the well-pleaded
complaint rule, meaning that Section 502 completely preempts any well-pleaded
state law cause of action that duplicates, supplements or supplants the Section 502
ERISA remedial scheme.223
The Supreme Court decision in Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila provides the
definitive interpretation of Section 514 complete preemption in relation to
employment-based health insurance plans. In Davila, two plaintiffs, in separate, but
consolidated cases, sued their insurers for rejecting their respective doctors’
recommendations related to coverage for an arthritis drug and an extended hospital
stay following surgery, respectively.224 The plaintiffs sought recovery under a Texas
statute that provided for a state law cause of action against a health insurer who
violates its duty to exercise ordinary care when making health care treatment
decisions.225
The Supreme Court held that the state law claims were completely preempted by
ERISA Section 502 because the state law claims were really claims for wrongfully
denied benefits and were not claims alleging violation of a legal duty independent of
ERISA.226 The Court further held that ERISA preempted the state law claims
because the state law claims supplemented the ERISA remedies with additional tortlike remedies.227 Accordingly, the nature of the state law claims were for a denial of

218

29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006).

219

Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A).

220

Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B).

221

Id.

222

Id. at § 1132(a).

223

Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 207-09 (2004).

224

Id. at 204-05.
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Id. at 205.

226

Id. at 214.
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Id. at 214-16.
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benefits, fell within the scope of ERISA and were completely preempted by ERISA
Section 502.228
Given the ERISA statute and Davila, it appears that injured patients have few, if
any, state law tort claims against their employment-based insurers when the insurer’s
actions proximately cause the patient’s injury.229 Justice Ginsburg’s concurring
opinion, in Davila, referenced a regulatory vacuum created by ERISA as to claims
against ERISA plans, whereby “[v]irtually all state law remedies are preempted but
very few federal substitutes are provided.”230 Available remedies are limited to the
value of wrongfully denied benefits,231 breach of fiduciary duty damages, where the
fiduciary’s actions result in a loss to the plan or a gain to the fiduciary232 and other
equitable relief.233 However, the breach of fiduciary duty damages are only available
to the plan itself, not the plan beneficiary.234 Moreover, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the equitable relief provision to narrowly include only the value of
wrongfully denied benefits.235 In the end, the beneficiary, in an ERISA action against
his or her insurer, is limited to recovery for the value of wrongfully denied benefits
and there are no ERISA consequential or punitive damages available.236
ERISA plan insurers obviously benefit from the veritable immunity that they
receive from state tort law.237 Providers and patients, on the other hand, are not so
228

Id. at 221.

229

But see id. at 218-21 (interpreting Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000), as holding
that ERISA does not preempt State law claims against physician owned HMOs, where the
conduct at issue involves a mixed treatment and eligibility decision and not just a plan
fiduciary eligibility decision); Badal v. Hinsdale Mem’l Hosp., 2007 WL 1424205 (N.D. Ill.
2007) (holding that ERISA did not preempt claim against employment-based insurer where
plaintiff was not complaining of wrongfully denied benefits, but was seeking to hold the
insurer vicariously liable for his physician’s negligence in misdiagnosing an ankle injury);
Smelik v. Mann, No. 2003-CI-06936 (Tex. 224th Dist. Ct., Bexar Cnty. June 28, 2005),
available at http://www.crowell.com/pdf/managedcare/Smelik.pdf (jury verdict against
employment-based HMO for mismanaged care instead of denial of benefits).
230

Davila, 542 U.S. at 222.

231

29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (West 2013); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S.
134, 148 (1985) (holding that ERISA does not allow for extracontractual damages).
232

29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(2) (West 2013).

233

Id. § 1132(a)(3).

234

LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 552 U.S. 248, 254 (2008) (holding that only the
ERISA plan, not the beneficiary, can recover damages for breach of an ERISA fiduciary
duty).
235

Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209-18 (2001)
(narrowly interpreting ERISA’s equitable relief provision).
236

Peter K. Stris, ERISA Remedies, Welfare Benefits, & Bad Faith: Losing Sight of the
Cathedral, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 387, 394-95 (2009).
237
Duncan MacCourt & Joseph Bernstein, Medical Error Reduction & Tort Reform
Through Private, Contractually-Based Quality Medicine Societies, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 505,
519 (2009) (explaining that ERISA plans highly value the benefits of ERISA preemption
while placing the entire liability for medical malpractice squarely on the shoulders of
providers).
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welcoming of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of ERISA preemption. The patient
can still sue his or her provider for medical malpractice, but he or she is effectively
denied access to the deep pockets of the insurer.238
ERISA preemption places providers in an even more uncompromising position.
ERISA plans can impose cost cutting measures on or incentivize providers to adopt
cost cutting measures without concern for any negative outcomes to the plan itself
because the ERISA plan is unlikely to be held liable for any resulting patient
injury.239 Providers, however, are stuck between a rock and a hard place. On the one
hand, providers must implement such cost cutting measures or face termination from
the MCO provider network and loss of their patient base.240 On the other hand,
providers also have an ethical duty to provide all necessary care to their patients,
regardless of cost,241 and face potential malpractice liability if they cut beneficial
care.242 Because of ERISA preemption of ERISA plan state tort liability, providers
must implement the MCO cost cutting measures, while at the same time shouldering
all of the liability burden.243Accordingly, ERISA preemption removes the specter of
medical malpractice liability as an obstacle to ERISA plan cost cutting measures,
albeit at the expense of patients and providers. Plaintiffs’ lawyers are much less
willing to sue ERISA plans when their actions are connected to patient injury,
especially given that the health care provider is still an available pocket for
compensation.244 Without question, ERISA plans can much more easily control costs
with ERISA preemption than without it. Given the significance of ERISA
preemption to insurers’ ability to engage in cost control, the question is how this
ERISA preemption dynamic will play out in the health insurance exchanges, if and
when insurers attempt to use managed care-type tools control the anticipated high
exchange costs and avoid adverse selection.
238

Sanson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 618, 625 (11th Cir. 1992) (Birch, J., dissenting)
(“The combination [of an employee’s] state cause of action [being] preempted by ERISA even
while ERISA denies him any alternative remedy . . . is disappointingly pernicious to the very
goals . . . that motivated Congress to enact pension laws.”).
239

See Jennifer Arlen & W. Bentley MacLeod, Malpractice Liability for Physicians &
Managed Care Organizations, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1929, 1932 (2003) (arguing that ERISA
preemption allows employment-based MCOs to focus on cost cutting without regard for any
negative quality impacts); MacCourt & Bernstein, supra note 237, at 519 (explaining that
ERISA preemption allows ERISA plans to focus on profit from limiting medical care and
avoid implementing quality measures, such as best practices standards).
240

Dionne Koller Fine, Physician Liability & Managed Care: A Philosophical Perspective,
19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 641, 673-76 (2003) (explaining that providers who fail to ration care or
cut costs in line with ERISA plan policies face termination from the MCO’s provider
network).
241

MARK HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS: THE LAW, ETHICS,
ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS 131 (Oxford Univ. Press 1997).

AND

242
Smith, supra note 203, at 174-75 (explaining that providers engage in defensive
medicine because of fear of medical malpractice liability, which actually raises costs and
undermines MCO cost cutting efforts).
243

MacCourt & Bernstein, supra note 237, at 519.

244

Agrawal & Hall, supra note 205, at 251 (explaining that both plaintiff and defense
lawyers believe that ERISA preemption has deterred the number of plaintiff lawsuits against
ERISA plans).
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C. The Lack of ERISA Preemption in the Individual Insurance Exchanges
Although ERISA preemption will still apply to employment-based insurers
within the SHOP exchanges, it will not protect individual exchange plans from state
tort suits, where their cost-cutting measures proximately cause patient injury.
Because ERISA only governs employee benefit plans and because individual
exchange plans are not connected to employment, there is no ERISA protection for
such plans. The result is a “tale of two” insurer markets, in which self-insured and
fully-insured employment plans, inside or outside of the exchanges, will be protected
by ERISA from potential state tort claims, but not so with regard to individual
exchange plans.
The lack of ERISA preemption for individual exchange plans poses serious
concerns for those insurers who wish to engage in cost-cutting and use managed
care-type tools to combat the likely high costs within the exchanges. The threat of
tort liability against individual exchange insurers may overly deter them from
engaging in beneficial managed care cost cutting.245 Not all managed care cost
cutting is bad; historically, there is support for the argument that managed care can
cut wasteful spending without harming patient quality.246 However, the threat of
liability does not discriminate and will deter all cost cutting, both good and bad.247
As a consequence, individual insurers, without ERISA protection, may entirely
abandon managed care and cost-cutting efforts within the individual exchanges.248
Without those cost-cutting measures, insurers are unable to target wasteful spending
and the adverse selection and high cost problems likely to impact the individual
exchanges will remain unabated and will grow.
The threat of insurer liability could lead to a phenomenon akin to doctors who
practice defensive medicine.249 Physicians who engage in defensive medicine
provide excessive or unnecessary care or tests, or avoid risky patients or treatments
because they fear that skimping on care or caring for risky patients might expose

245

Katherine L. Record, Note, Wielding the Wand Without Facing the Music: Allowing
Utilization Review Physicians to Trump Doctors’ Orders, but Protecting them from the Legal
Risk Ordinarily Attached to the Medical Degree, 59 DUKE L.J. 955, 996 (2010) (arguing that
tort liability must be strictly limited because “imposing unlimited liability, or creating
liability risk even when coverage is properly denied, could deter managed care entities from
implementing any cost-containment policies at all”).
246
Max Huffman, Competition Policy in Health Care in an Era of Reform, 7 IND. HEALTH
L. REV. 225, 248 (2010) (noting that HMOs in the 1990s successfully cut costs without
damaging patient quality).
247
Agrawal & Hall, supra note 205, at 261 (explaining that some scholars argue that the
threat of medical liability is excessive because the tort system is imperfect and poses the threat
of liability for harm unrelated to bad acts, as much as it poses the threat of liability for harm
that can be tied to bad acts).
248
Id. at 262 (arguing that “the specter of tort liability could chill innovation in techniques
to manage care and cost or could lead the managed care industry to abandon the cost-control
function entirely without another mechanism in place to fulfill that function”).
249
Carl Giesler, Managers of Medicine: The Interplay Between MCOs, Quality of Care &
Tort Reform, 6 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 31, 62-63 (1999) (arguing that HMO tort liability
could lead to the authorization of medically unnecessary care).
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them to unpredictable tort liability.250 Similarly, within the context of the individual
exchanges, shifting or expanding the risk of liability away from the health care
provider and onto the insurer raises concerns that individual exchange insurers will
engage in an analogous form of defensive medicine-type behavior. Fearing liability,
such insurers may remove beneficial cost constraints aimed at cutting waste, remove
provider incentives that reduce wasteful spending, and approve wasteful and
unnecessary medical claims. However, the failure to eliminate wasteful care only
raises the overall cost of care, which will likely be passed along to exchange
beneficiaries in the form of higher premiums. If the threat of insurer tort liability
within the individual exchanges is too great and the costs to provide individual
insurance are too high, then insurers may go further than engaging in defensive
medicine-type behavior and might entirely abandon the individual exchanges.251
Given that fully-insured or self-insured employment plans are shielded from state
tort liability by ERISA and given that those markets are large insurance markets,252
individual insurers have even less reason to work hard to make the individual
exchanges function effectively. If costs get out of hand within the individual
exchanges, insurers can just leave the individual exchanges and focus their efforts on
employment-based insurance. Unfortunately, an exodus of insurers from the
individual exchanges could ultimately lead to the collapse of the exchanges.
Even if insurers do not drop out of the insurance exchanges, their potential tort
liability may cause insurance premiums within the exchange to rise. There are
significant costs for insurers in defending against beneficiary tort suits and insurers
tend to settle such suits early on, even if the insurer is probably not at fault.253
Accordingly, at least some of these costs are not even attributable to valid tort
claims. Yet, insurers are likely to pass these litigation and settlement costs along to
enrollees in the form of higher premiums. By contrast, with ERISA preemption,
there are fewer state tort claims against insurers, which means lower litigation and
settlement costs.254 Hence, ERISA plan insurers need not be concerned with passing
along litigation and settlement costs to their beneficiaries.
Beyond the practical negative impacts of subjecting insurers to potential tort
liability, imposing medical malpractice liability on insurers may be bad policy.
Arguably, injured patients already have a source of recovery for medical malpractice
injuries via their doctors and their doctors’ medical malpractice insurer.255 Imposing
250

David M. Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist Physicians in
a Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 JAMA 2609, 2609-10 (2005) (defining defensive
medicine as a “deviation from sound medical practice that is induced primarily by a threat of
liability”).
251
Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 12, at 131-32 (arguing that adverse selection and the
high costs associated with adverse selection could render the exchanges unsustainable).
252

Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.
(2011), http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=125&cat=3 (noting that 48% of
the country’s population receives insurance through their employer).
253

Agrawal & Hall, supra note 205, at 263.

254

Id. at 251.

255

Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Liability: A Minefield for Managed Care?, 26 J. LEGAL STUD.
491 (1997); Richard A. Epstein, Vicarious Liability of Health Plans for Medical Injuries, 34
VAL. U. L. REV. 581 (2000).
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liability upon the insurer is duplicative and merely adds unnecessary costs onto the
health care system.256
Individual exchange beneficiaries and health care providers would probably
disagree with these arguments. On the surface, under the status quo, individual
exchange beneficiaries who are injured by insurer cost cutting would welcome the
ability to hold their insurers accountable. Some argue that “there is some reason to
believe that managed care organizations are better positioned to process liability
signals than are individual clinicians…[since] managed care organizations are in the
business of spreading risk, and, with time and experience, should be more able to
gauge their response to the increased risk of liability.”257 Moreover, injured
beneficiaries would view the insurer as the true locus of responsibility, at least where
the health care provider correctly claims that the patient harm was the direct or
indirect result of managed care cost cutting and not the provider’s independent
medical judgment or skill. For the injured beneficiary, the insurer serves as another
deep pocket for recovery and a deeper pocket than the health care provider.258 The
insurer may be seen as an easier target than the provider in the vein of the “big bad
insurance company” in contrast to the kind doctor who is devoted to his community.
While on the surface the lack of ERISA preemption may seem like a good thing
for exchange beneficiaries, a deeper dive reveals that beneficiaries will see negative
impacts in the long run. As discussed supra, increased insurer liability can lead to
increased costs. Insurers will not eat these costs; they will pass them along to
individual exchange beneficiaries in the form of higher premiums.259 In fact, the
trickle down costs may be quite high, as compared to physicians, insurers are more
likely to be subject to larger awards and/or punitive damages awards.260 Exchange
beneficiaries will suffer the consequences of increased insurer liability as much as
they enjoy the benefits thereof. In fact, if individual exchange insurers are also
providing insurance in other ERISA regulated markets, they may pass along the
increased exchange-based litigation costs to all of their beneficiaries, and not just the
ones in the individual exchanges.
Unlike beneficiaries, providers probably have less to lose from increased insurer
liability in the individual exchanges. With the potential for insurer liability for
medical malpractice, providers no longer have to bear the liability burden alone.261
They will no longer be stuck in the middle between insurer cost cutting pressures, on
one side, and the threat of medical malpractice liability if they cut beneficial care;
256

Agrawal & Hall, supra note 205, at 268.

257

Id. at 270-71.

258

Kristin Madison, ERISA & Liability for Provision of Medical Information, 84 N.C. L.
REV. 471, 539 n.276 (2006) (discussing that MCOs have greater liability exposure than health
care providers).
259

Id. at 539 (arguing that insurer “informational liability may increase operational costs
for MCOs, ultimately increasing premiums for consumers”).
260
Id. at 539 n.276 (noting that “while punitive damages are rarely awarded in physician
malpractice cases . . . courts have awarded substantial damages in cases involving MCOs”).
261

Fine, supra note 240, at 679 (noting that “the current policy of encouraging control of
health care costs through the use of MCOs, which achieves (or attempts to achieve) health
care cost reductions through the use of bedside rationing, is unfair because physicians and
MCOs do not share the liability burdens for such rationing”).
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the insurer will have to share the burden, as well. In fact, if the insurer is found to be
more at fault for the patient’s injury, the provider may be able to shift a greater
portion of the liability costs to the insurer through contribution and joint and several
liability.262
Nonetheless, even providers could face a couple of potential downsides to
increased individual exchange insurer liability. First, if individual exchange insurers
face higher costs due to litigation, they could put pressure on providers to accept
reimbursement cuts, as a way to offset the higher costs. Second, if insurer liability
ultimately leads to insurers abandoning the exchanges, then many individual
exchange beneficiaries will lose coverage and providers’ covered patient population
will shrink. While insured patients provide a steady stream of income for providers,
there is less stability with regard to patients who cannot obtain insurance and must
pay out-of-pocket.263 An increase in uninsured patients would force providers to
absorb some of the costs of caring for the uninsured population and pass those costs
along to health care insurers and their beneficiaries.264
V. SOLUTIONS TO THE INDIVIDUAL EXCHANGE ERISA PROBLEM
A. Altering the Scope of ERISA Preemption
The lack of ERISA preemption within the individual exchanges plainly poses
problems in terms of the ability of individual exchange insurers to engage in
beneficial cost cutting and the potential for insurer tort liability to lead to high prices
within the exchanges. There are various solutions to addressing the ERISA problem,
but this article focuses on the creation of a no-fault insurer liability system. Such a
proposal both protects insurers against catastrophic tort damages for harmful cost
cutting and provides injured beneficiaries with some form of remedy when they are
injured by insurer cost cutting. An alternative to the no-fault solution is to
legislatively eliminate ERISA preemption for all insurers, thereby leveling the
ERISA preemption playing field between individual exchange insurers and
employment-based insurers. Some would argue that ERISA preemption relies too
much on the competitive market to regulate insurers’ abusive cost cutting tactics.265
In the employment context, employers’ information costs are too great in isolating
and avoiding the abusive insurers and it is far from clear whether employers can pass
these costs along to their employees, so that employees will choose their employer

262
Dunn v. Praiss, 656 A.2d 413, 416 (N.J. 1995) (holding that “a physician-provider who
has been found guilty of medical malpractice [may] seek[] contribution from his HMO on the
basis of its independent breach of contractual duty to a patient-subscriber of the HMO”).
263

Arthur Birmingham LaFrance, Healthcare Reform in the United States: The Role of the
States, 6 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 199, 222 (2007) (noting that the advent of health insurance in
the 1930s provided doctors with a stable income).
264

Jay, supra note 7, at 1151-52.

265

Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Supreme Court’s Assault on Litigation: Why (and How) it
Might Be Good for Health Law, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2323, 2354 (2010) [hereinafter Moncrieff,
Assault on Litigation] (arguing that employers do not monitor MCOs sufficiently to weed out
MCOs with abusive practices).
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based on the quality of that employer’s insurers or the strength of that employer’s
efforts to combat insurer abuses.266
Elimination of ERISA preemption, across-the-board, and the specter of tort
liability would certainly discourage insurers from engaging in cost cutting measures
that negatively impact quality. It would also equitably ensure that insurers, and not
just providers, are held accountable for cost cutting that harms patients. Moreover,
all patients—not just those purchasing insurance from the individual exchanges—
would have an additional deep pocket remedy source for their injury or harm.
Finally, treating all insurers the same avoids a scenario under which insurers would
avoid providing insurance through the exchanges and seek to provide insurance
solely in the employment context in order to maximize their ERISA-based immunity
from tort suits.
Despite the benefits of this solution, there are a number of problems. First, as
discussed supra, the specter of potential tort liability could over deter insurer cost
cutting, such that all insurers would refuse to engage in beneficial cost cutting, or
cost cutting that eliminates waste from the health care system without causing harm
to beneficiaries.267 Second, open ended tort liability could drive up insurance costs
throughout the industry.268 All insurers might raise premiums to account for potential
catastrophic tort damages, passing along the costs to beneficiaries and their
employers. Third, the elimination of ERISA preemption is not politically feasible.
ERISA preemption has withstood the test of time for forty years and history
demonstrates that the insurance industry will not allow its repeal.269
Some argue that the Department of Labor (“DOL”) should give teeth to the
ERISA “equitable relief” remedy, such that ERISA plans would face real liability for
cost cutting that results in patient injury. The DOL could use its regulatory authority
to define the “equitable relief” provision of ERISA to include damages for patient
injuries, in addition to any wrongfully denied benefits.270 Alternatively, the DOL
could monitor employment-based insurers and impose penalties on those who
abusively engage in cost cutting that leads to patient harm.271 However, these
solutions are not much different than eliminating ERISA preemption across-theboard and carry with them the same problems.
An alternative solution is the opposite extreme. Instead of eliminating ERISA
preemption, Congress could expand ERISA preemption to include individual
266

Id. at 2352-55 (arguing that employers are incentivized to do what is cheapest, not best
in terms of picking health insurers for their employees).
267
Robert F. Rich, The Two Faces of Managed Care Regulation & Policymaking, 16 STAN.
L. & POL’Y REV. 233, 272-73 (2005) (noting that insurers argue that MCO liability hinders the
ability of MCOs to improve patient quality).
268

Id. (noting that insurers argue that MCO liability increases the costs of managed care).

269

Roderick M. Hills Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National
Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 42-43 (2007) (outlining repeated failures to repeal
ERISA preemption throughout the 1990s due to massive public relations efforts by MCOs).
Technically, ERISA preemption, as it is recognized today, is rooted in Supreme Court
jurisprudence, but the Supreme Court is unlikely to reverse course, so a legislative reversal
would likely be necessary.
270

Moncrieff, Assault on Litigation, supra note 265, at 2341-42.

271

Id. at 2342-43.
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exchange insurers. Such a move would eliminate any disincentive for insurers to
avoid the individual exchanges for fear of tort liability. Moreover, such tort
immunity would allow individual exchange insurers to engage more freely in cost
cutting measures and more effectively fight high costs within the exchanges.272 As a
consequence, premiums would be less likely to skyrocket due to the threat of insurer
liability and insurers feeling hamstringed from engaging in cost cutting.
In the end, complete ERISA preemption across-the-board is no better than
complete elimination of ERISA preemption. With universal ERISA preemption in
place, individual exchange insurers, as is currently the case with non-exchange
insurers, would not be held accountable when they engage in cost cutting that results
in patient injury. Although the individual insurance exchanges impose quality
regulations on the individual exchange insurers,273 the fear remains that the lack of a
tort deterrent would allow individual exchange insurers to engage in cost cutting that
has a negative impact on patient quality.
Politically, patients and providers would strongly oppose such a policy solution.
Under the status quo individual exchange beneficiaries will be able to sue their
insurers for harmful cost cutting. Expanding ERISA preemption asks them to forego
this tort remedy. If ERISA preemption is expanded, injured beneficiaries are left
with a sole remedy against their physician, who may not be at fault for the injury.
Likewise, providers would also oppose changing the status quo. Providers do not
want to shoulder the entire burden of liability, as they do in the ERISA context.
Accordingly, as much as the repeal of ERISA preemption across-the-board is dead
on arrival, so is the policy solution of ERISA preemption expansion.274
B. A No-Fault Compensation System Solution
1. Why a No-Fault Compensation System is a Good Solution
The best solution to the ERISA problem in the individual exchanges may be a
middle ground solution. Such a solution needs to balance the interests at issue.
Insurers need to have some level of accountability for harmful cost cutting, while not
being subjected to open-ended and possibly catastrophic tort liability. At the same
time, physicians should not bear the burden of tort liability, when insurers are
partially or fully at fault for the resulting harm. Moreover, patients should have
access to sufficient remedies when they are injured by insurer cost cutting measures.
Accordingly, a better solution than the all or nothing solutions, outlined supra, is
to create a no-fault compensation fund as a limited tort remedy against individual
exchange insurers, when they engage in cost cutting measures that lead to patient
harm. For many years, scholars have floated this idea as an entire replacement for
the medical malpractice tort system.275 Within the health law world, the no-fault
272

Theodore W. Ruger, The United States Supreme Court & Health Law: The Year in
Review, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 528, 531 (2004) (describing the Davila ERISA preemption of
state tort law as allowing employers to more effectively cut health care costs).
273

See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(c)(1) (West 2012).

274

See Hills, supra note 269, at 53 (arguing that the ERISA preemption immunity created
through Supreme Court decisions would never win a majority vote in Congress).
275

See Paul J. Barringer et al., Administrative Compensation of Medical Injuries: A Hardy
Perennial Blooms Again, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 725, 728 (2008); Eleanor D. Kinney,
Malpractice Reform in the 1990s: Past Disappointment, Future Success?, 20 J. HEALTH POL.
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concept has even been implemented in several limited situations. Congress enacted a
no-fault system for childhood vaccination injuries through the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act (“NVIC”).276 Virginia and Florida also implemented a no-fault
system for medical malpractice connected to birth injuries.277
The general overview of any no-fault compensation system is an administrative
system versus a court-based litigation system, which provides predictable
compensation in a less expensive and more expedient manner than litigation.278 The
victim need not show fault,279 but need only show that his or her injury falls within
the confines of the no-fault system, or that a triggering no-fault event occurred.280
The plaintiff is often limited to recovering only compensatory damages, usually as a
percentage of his or her actual economic loss, and usually excluding pain and
suffering.281
No-fault compensation schemes generally have three goals. First, such schemes
socialize the risk, compensating as many injured individuals as possible, spreading
the burden of the damages across many actors and over time.282 Accordingly, a
larger percentage of payouts go to deserving victims, in contrast to the tort system,
which absorbs some of the funds in the form of transactional costs.283 Second, nofault systems aim to limit the liability of the tortfeasor and provide the tortfeasor

POL’Y & L. 99, 106 (1995); Jeffrey O’Connell, No-Fault Insurance for Injuries Arising from
Medical Treatment: A Proposal for Elective Coverage, 24 EMORY L.J. 21, 34-42 (1975).
276

See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-10-25 (West 2012).

277

See Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, FLA. STAT.
§§ 766.301-316 (2010); Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act, VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5000 to -5021 (2007).
278

See Sagir Mor & Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Relational Malpractice, 42 SETON HALL L.
REV. 601, 625 (2012) (proposing a no-fault system for medical malpractice claims with a
focus on improving the doctor-patient relationship).
279
See Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins & Economic Structure of Workers’
Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775, 800 (1982).
280

See Joseph H. King Jr., The Exclusiveness of an Employee’s Workers’ Compensation
Remedy Against His Employer, 55 Tenn. L. Rev. 405, 406 (1998); Mor & Rabinovich-Einy,
supra note 278, at 625.
281

See King, supra note 280, at 407.

282

See Donald G. Gifford et al., A Case Study in the Superiority of the Purposive Approach
to Statutory Interpretation: Brueswitz v. Wyeth, 64 S.C. L. REV. 221, 247-248 (2012)
(explaining that one of the purposes of no-fault compensation schemes is to ensure that more
people are compensated than through the traditional tort system); Marc A. Rodwin, French
Medical Malpractice Law & Policy Through American Eyes: What It Reflects About Public
and Private Aspects of American Law, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 109, 135 (2011).
283
See Elizabeth R. Pike, Recovering From Research: A No-Fault Proposal to Compensate
Injured Research Participants, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 45-46 (2012) (touting the benefits of a
no-fault system for injured research participants compared to the remedies available to them
through the existing tort system); Rodwin, supra note 282, at 137 (noting that “studies show
that malpractice litigation does not compensate most individuals injured due to negligence;
furthermore, it holds parties liable for bad outcomes not caused by negligence”).
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with predictable liability exposure.284 This is important for tortfeasors who might
otherwise abandon their product or industry due to the possibility of open-ended
catastrophic tort damages. Third, no-fault systems seek to reduce the transactional
costs spent to obtain a remedy and speed up the recovery process in contrast to the
high transactional costs and slowness of the traditional tort system.285 Generally, the
overall compensation is lower, but it is seen as a tradeoff, providing more
predictability and more compensation to more injured parties in exchange for
avoiding the expensive, unpredictable and complex tort system.286
A no-fault system is fitting for insurer liability within the insurance exchanges
because it splits the baby. Beneficiaries injured by insurer cost cutting can quickly
and easily obtain some form of recovery through the fund, while insurers need not
worry that catastrophic tort suits by injured beneficiaries could drive them into
bankruptcy.287 Predictability benefits both the injured beneficiary and the insurers.
For beneficiaries, a no-fault system has advantages over the existing tort system,
which is criticized for unpredictably overcompensating a few injured plaintiffs,
while at the same time undercompensating or failing to compensate many plaintiffs
with valid injuries.288 Insurers, on the other hand, benefit from the predictability
because the potential for catastrophic liability awards might otherwise drive insurers
out of the individual exchange market, prevent them from entering the market or
drive up costs and premiums within the individual exchange market. A no-fault
system is also fitting for insurer liability within the individual exchanges, as such
systems are very useful in situations where it is difficult to prove causation.289 In the
insurer liability context, it is not necessarily easy to demonstrate that an insurer cost
cutting measure caused an individual’s injury versus poor healthcare provider
decision-making or judgment, or pure malpractice on the part of the healthcare
provider.
Additionally, the timing for a no-fault system may be appropriate as a no-fault
system is in alignment with the philosophy of the ACA.290 The ACA is very much
284

See Gifford et al., supra note 282, at 249 (arguing that the existing tort system leads to
unpredictable catastrophic awards that can cripple a business or drive up liability insurance
rates).
285

See Pike, supra note 283, at 45-46.

286

See Mor & Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 278, at 842 (demonstrating that no-fault
schemes are more efficient at compensating injured parties with a larger portion of no-fault
funds going toward compensating the injured party as a result of attorneys’ fees caps, limited
discovery, and elimination of expensive trials).
287

See Nadia W. Sawicki, Patient Protection & Decision-Aid Quality: Regulatory & Tort
Law Approaches, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 653 (2012) (arguing the benefits of efficiency and
uniformity for of no-fault compensation systems in the context of the protecting patients in the
use of patient decision-making aids).
288

See Amalea Smirniotopoulos, Bad Medicine: Prescription Drugs, Preemption, & the
Potential for a No-Fault Fix, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 793, 842-43 (2011)
(explaining that many medical malpractice plaintiffs within the existing tort system are unable
to find or afford an attorney, and therefore bear the costs of their injuries alone).
289

See Sawicki, supra note 287, at 653.

290

See Nora Freeman Engstrom, An Alternative Explanation for No-Fault’s “Demise”, 61
DEPAUL L. REV. 303, 354-55 (2012) (arguing that enactment of no-fault schemes have been
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grounded on the concept of cost spreading.291 The ACA seeks to spread the cost of
health care across as much of the population as possible, through the individual
mandate, insurance exchange subsidies, the Medicaid expansion, and the insurance
exchanges. A no-fault system would track the ACA philosophy with an emphasis on
spreading the cost of insurer-induced injuries.
A no-fault proposal in this limited context may also be timely because of the
raging emotional debate over medical malpractice tort reform. When the excesses
and limits of the tort system combine to reach a certain boiling point, historically,
there has been greater success in enacting no-fault systems.292 Such a tipping point
may be at hand with regard to issues related to medical malpractice, and insurer cost
cutting measures that lead to patient harm are part and parcel of medical malpractice.
On one side, tort reformers passionately argue that defensive medicine is costing
billions of dollars annually and that tort liability is causing some providers to leave
certain specialties or limit services, producing severe access problems for patients.293
At the same time, the opposition to tort reform tugs at the heart strings and rails
against existing tort reform measures for their limitations and failure to provide
compensation to legitimately injured patients, as illustrated in the movie Hot
Coffee.294
2. Structuring the Insurer No-Fault Liability Fund and the Compensable Event
Having established the rationale and timing for a no-fault system, the next issue
is how to construct one. This article envisions an administrative system modeled
primarily after the NVIC system. Accordingly, what follows is a brief outline of the
elements of the NVIC that are pertinent to the proposed insurer no-fault system.
Congress created the NVIC in 1986 as a federal no-fault compensation system
for childhood vaccination injuries, after large damage awards against vaccine
manufacturers raised concerns that they would stop manufacturing vaccines and
would leave the market.295 Under the NVIC system, an injured claimant files a claim
with the United States Court of Federal Claims, which refers the claim to a Special

most successful during time periods when there was a push to cost spread, such as with the
creation of Medicare and Medicaid in the 1960s).
291
See Kevin G. Volpp et al., Redesigning Employee Health Incentives-Lessons from
Behavioral Economics, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 388, 389 (2011) (arguing that “[e]nabling
employers to vary premiums on the basis of employees’ health-related behaviors or health
outcomes could undermine some of the ACA’s intended benefits . . . [such as] spread[ing] the
costs of addressing health risks across the population”)
292

See Engstrom, supra note 290, at 359 (arguing that impatience with the limitations and
excesses of the tort system led, in part, to the enactment of no-fault automobile accident
legislation).
293
See Amy T. Campbell, Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Frame the Role of Emotion
in Health Policymaking, 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 675, 681-82 (2012) (discussing how emotion is
driving policymaking in the context of medical malpractice reform).
294

See id. at 682; HOT COFFEE (HBO Documentary Films 2011).

295

See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION: PROGRAM
CHALLENGED TO SETTLE CLAIMS QUICKLY & EASILY 1, 4 (Dec. 1999), avalable at http://www.
gao.gov/archive/2000/he00008.pdf.
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Master.296 If the claimant’s injury is identified on a vaccine injury table, which links
specific vaccines to specific injuries, then the claimant is entitled to a presumption of
causation.297 The HHS Secretary serves as the Respondent and can rebut the
presumption of causation by demonstrating that the injury was not caused by the
vaccination.298 If the HHS Secretary fails to rebut the presumption, then the
presumption stands and the claimant wins.
Alternatively, if the claimant’s claim does not appear on the vaccine injury table,
then the claimant must prove causation and must do so under a preponderance of the
evidence standard.299 The claimant loses if he or she fails to meet the burden of
proof, or if the HHS Secretary proves alternative causation.300 Under either scenario,
the HHS Secretary may also challenge the compensation amount,301 and in the end,
the Special Master makes the injury eligibility determination and the award
compensation determination.302
Similarly, this article envisions an administrative system with a special master
falling under the judicial branch, and a government agency—probably HHS—
challenging the claim on eligibility and/or compensation level grounds. It is
important to note the independence of the special master from HHS in the NVIC
system, which eliminates concerns of improper influence from HHS on the special
master.303 The same must be done with regard to the insurer no-fault system in order
to preserve independence and impartiality.
Beyond the general structural considerations, constructing a no-fault
compensation scheme requires defining a compensable event and determining who
should finance the no-fault system.304 In defining the compensable event, no-fault
systems do not focus on tortious conduct and fault for the injury at hand,305 but
rather, as with the NVIC, they focus on the issues of causation and the appropriate
level of damages.306 Oftentimes, there is also a monetary damages threshold to
296

See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-12 (West 2012).

297

See Zatuchni v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 69 Fed. Cl. 612, 620-21 (2006), aff’d,
516 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
298

See Nilson v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 69 Fed. Cl. 678, 680-81 (2006).

299

See Zatuchni, 69 Fed. Cl. at 621-22.

300

See Capizzano v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 63 Fed. Cl. 227, 231 (2004).

301
See Derry Ridgway, No-Fault Vaccine Insurance: Lessons from the National Vaccine
Injury Compensation Program, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 59, 64 (1999) (the focus of
NVIC disputes revolve around causation of the injury and the amount of compensation).
302
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-12 (West 2012) (requiring a Special Master to make a
recommendation within 240 days on whether or not to pay the NVIC claim and how much to
pay).
303

See Smirniotopoulos, supra note 288, at 848-49.

304

See Gifford et al., supra note 282, at 251 (providing a structural overview of the
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program).
305
See id. at 252 (noting that like other no-fault compensation schemes, those seeking
compensation through NVIC need not prove tortious conduct on the part of the vaccine
manufacturer).
306

See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-14(a) (West 2012).
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trigger application of the no-fault system, which focuses the system on more serious
claims and keeps down the costs of operating the system.307
Applying this sort of scheme to an insurer liability fund, the injured beneficiary
should be required to demonstrate an injury, causation from insurer activity, such as
negligent cost cutting, and the appropriate level of compensation. Both the eligibility
of a claim and the award compensation level could be determined through hearings
and written filings under a preponderance of the evidence standard.308 The key issue,
causation, could be established in one of two different ways, both with their
advantages and disadvantages.
The first option is to design a no-fault system to very loosely mirror the NVIC
system. Under the NVIC system, the injury table lists various injuries, categorized
by vaccine, with a time period in which the injury must arise for the claim to be
eligible.309 With an insurer no-fault system, it is not possible to set up such a simple
system. Unlike with vaccines, it cannot be said that a specific insurer action, such as
a claim denial, leads to one of several specific injury types, such as death, stroke, or
brain damage. Moreover, the list of possible injuries resulting from insurer actions is
pretty much unlimited. Insurer actions can lead to any of a multitude of patient
harms.
Accordingly, the closest analogy to the NVIC system would be to create a table
of insurer cost-cutting activities, such as claim denials, coverage approval delays,
specialist restrictions, utilization management, utilization review, that would
presumptively trigger a claim. However, in addition to identifying an insurer practice
on the table, the claimant would also need to present some sort of injury and
something additional to demonstrate the causal link between the injury and the
insurer practice. The best way to accomplish this, in a cost efficient manner, would
be to require something akin to a Certificate of Merit (“COM”), as is used in many
state medical malpractice cases. In the medical malpractice context, as a condition of
filing a medical malpractice claim, the COM requirement requires plaintiffs to file a
brief expert statement delineating the provider’s breach of the standard of care and
causation of the plaintiff’s damages.310 Similarly, the claimant to the insurer no-fault
fund would have to present an expert statement identifying the claimant’s injury and
delineating how the insurer’s practice caused the claimant’s injury. Combined with
an insurer practice listed in the table, this would create a prima facie case or
presumption of causation.
Following establishment of a presumption of causation, the HHS Secretary
would then have the opportunity to rebut the presumption by demonstrating
307

See id. §§ 300aa-11, -12 (requiring NVIC claimants to have suffered injuries of $1,000
or greater for the NVIC system to apply); Pike, supra note 283, at 58 (explaining that other
countries use monetary thresholds to trigger application of no-fault compensation systems for
those injured in research trials).
308

See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-13 (West 2012) (using a preponderance of the evidence
standard to determine compensation eligibility within the NVIC system); Smirniotopoulos,
supra note 288, at 835 (discussing the general procedure used by most no-fault systems for
determining eligibility and compensation levels).
309

See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-14 (West 2012).

310

See Benjamin Grossberg, Uniformity Federalism & Tort Reform: The Erie Implications
of Medical Malpractice Certificate of Merit Statutes, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 222-25 (2010)
(outlining the different State Certificate of Merit statutes).
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alternative causation, such as no causation or provider malpractice as the sole cause
of the injury. The HHS Secretary could be held to a preponderance of the evidence
rebuttal standard in order to ensure that the HHS Secretary does not challenge every
claim that arises, thereby maintaining lower transactional costs.
Though it seems unlikely, if the claimant identifies an insurer practice not listed
on the table, then, as with the NVIC, the beneficiary would bear the burden of proof,
under a preponderance of the evidence standard, to demonstrate that that insurer
practice caused the claimant’s injury. This alternative accounts for situations in
which insurers come up with new cost cutting measures, not identified on the table,
that potentially lead to patient harm.
Since the NVIC model hardly fits like a glove in the insurer liability context, this
model illustrates an alternative that promotes the core no-fault concepts of costefficiency and expediency, while providing a check on frivolous claims. The
claimant’s costs—a bare bones expert statement—and proof burdens—the mere
statement of a prima facie case—are substantially less than they would be in the tort
system. At the same time, potentially frivolous claims are deterred by the
requirement that the claimant must find an expert willing to state, on the record, that
causation exists and the fact that the HHS Secretary always remains available to
challenge causation. However, the preponderance of the evidence standard should
incentivize the HHS Secretary to attack only those causation claims that are truly
frivolous.
Recognizing the difficulties in creating an injury table in this context, an
alternative causation approach is found in the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological
Injury Compensation Act (“VBIA”), Virginia’s no-fault compensation system for
birth-related injuries. Under the VBIA, the Virginia Workers’ Compensation
Commission (“VWCC”) reviews relevant records to determine if a baby’s injury was
due to birth-related medical malpractice and the appropriate level of compensation,
using medical records, related documents, and sometimes interrogatories and
depositions to make those determinations.311 Applying the VBIA model to the
insurer liability context, a special master would play the same role as the VWCC and
would determine the existence of a claimant’s injury, insurer causation, and the
appropriate level of compensation using limited discovery from the claimant’s
insurance company and the patient’s medical records.
Critics might claim that the similarities between a VBIA-type system and the tort
system, as well as the difficulty of proving causation in the insurer liability context
might result in an informal duplicate of the tort system, with all of its attendant costs,
delays and failures to compensate deserving plaintiffs.312 While the VBIA approach
is fact intensive, it does avoid the injury table difficulties of the NVIC model.
Moreover, there are several ways to limit the transactional costs and ensure an
expedient and fair claims process in a VBIA model no-fault system.
First, imposing strict time limits on pre-hearing discovery and the hearing
process, with few, if any, options for extensions, should promote expediency.
Second, limiting discovery cuts down on both the delays and costs involved in the

311

See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5003-04, -5006-08.1 (2007).

312

See Smirniotopoulos, supra note 288, at 842-44 (discussing the difficulty of
determining causation in a no-fault system applied to medical injuries, especially those
involving injuries due to medical devices and drugs).
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claims process.313 Limited discovery also provides the added benefit of ensuring that
the insurer has some skin in the game and is still properly incentivized to avoid cost
cutting that leads to patient harm. In other words, if insurers know that they may
have to perform some document production, respond to interrogatories and possibly
participate in depositions, then they may take greater care to avoid harmful cost
cutting. They will want to avoid the transactional costs involved in being a
participant in the no-fault system process. This requirement addresses the criticism
that removal of fault and participation of the alleged tortfeasor from the no-fault
process hinders the ability of the process to improve quality of care.314
Third, a lenient preponderance of the evidence standard for proving causation
should also reduce transactional costs in proving a valid claim.315 Though such a
standard may also result in overcompensation for some claimants who do not have
valid claims of causation, the claimant is still required to meet a certain burden of
proof. Moreover, the HHS Secretary provides a check on frivolous claims through
the Secretary’s right to present evidence of alternative causation and to challenge the
beneficiary’s claim.
While the VBIA model may raise concerns that it is too much like the existing
tort system in terms of costs and inefficiency, it has certain advantages, as well.
First, it avoids the NVIC model problems of developing an injury table and allows
for more flexibility in assessing potential claims. Second, the fact-intensive nature of
the VBIA model requires some participation by insurers in the process, a cost that
insurers will have to take into consideration when determining how aggressively
they want to engage in cost cutting. Third, the fact-intensive nature of the VBIA
model, unlike the NVIC model, may allow for better accuracy in ensuring that the
most deserving claimants receive compensation. Regardless of which compensable
event model is chosen, there should be built in checks on the damage awards to
ensure that excessive damage awards do not swallow the no-fault system. First, the
government should be allowed to challenge the level of compensation. Second, the
final damages award should be based on compensatory damages, such as medical
expenses, life-care-type expenses, and lost wages, as well as pain and suffering
capped at a certain level.316 To allow for non-compensatory damages and/or
potentially unlimited pain and suffering damages undermines the predictability and
certainty that insurers need to buy into the concept of a compensation fund.317
Restricting or capping the available damages also helps to limit the cost to
administer the no-fault system.318 Moreover, limiting compensation to compensatory
313
See id. at 852 (proposing limited discovery for a no-fault compensation system for
medical drug and device injuries).
314

See Randall R. Bovbjerg & Frank A. Sloan, No-Fault for Medical Injury: Theory and
Evidence, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 53, 102-05 (1998) (noting that it is unclear whether the VBIA
has had any effect on quality of care in obstetrics).
315
See Smirniotopoulos, supra note 288, at 842-44 (arguing that a lenient preponderance of
the evidence standard is necessary in no-fault systems where causation is difficult to prove).
316

See King, supra note 280, at 407.

317

See Gifford et al., supra note 282, at 255 (arguing that capping the NVIC damages
allows for compensation of more victims and keeps vaccine manufacturers’ costs stable).
318

See David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, No-Fault Compensation for Medical
Injuries, 286 JAMA 217, 220 (2001) (finding a cap on damages and threshold damages
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damages addresses a common critique of the tort system that there is excessive
payment for noneconomic injuries compared to compensatory damages.319
On the surface damage limitations might appear to undercompensate
beneficiaries compared to the tort system, but the reality is more nuanced. A cap on
damages allows for more victims to be compensated, albeit at a lower level.320
Injured beneficiaries are still assured some level of compensation, without much of
their award being eaten up by litigation costs and attorneys’ fees. It is a tradeoff;
injured beneficiaries get faster and more certain, but lower financial recoveries, but
must forego potentially larger, but very uncertain and time-consuming efforts to
obtain tort damages through the court system.321 While critics claim that this tradeoff
undercompensates or fails to encompass the full range of injured individuals,322 the
argument is especially weak with regard to an insurer no-fault system, because even
claimants that lose their claims may still have viable medical malpractice claims
against their healthcare providers for their injuries.
3. Funding the Insurer No-Fault Liability Fund
The second major issue to be addressed in developing a no-fault compensation
system is the funding of the fund. Usually, the funding comes from charges imposed
on those who tend to cause the injuries that are being compensated through the fund,
which in the case of the NVIC system is the vaccine manufacturers.323 Applied to
insurer liability, this would mean imposing a tax or fee on all individual exchange
insurers. However, a better policy would be to spread the risk and costs further; the
insurer liability fund should be funded through a tax or fee imposed upon all
insurers, including employment-based plans and self-insured plans.
Such an approach accomplishes two goals. First, the liability burden is spread out
among many plans, having a less severe impact on any individual plan or only on
requirement triggering eligibility for a no-fault claim can control the cost of administering a
no-fault system).
319

See Engstrom, supra note 290, at 370 (explaining that one of the drivers behind no-fault
automobile accident systems was the concern that there was overcompensation for
noneconomic damages in the tort system, especially for minor automobile injuries).
320
See Gifford et al., supra note 282, at 255 (arguing that capping the NVIC damages
allows for compensation of more victims as lower damage awards allow for spreading the
damage awards across a larger group of individual victims).
321

See Jeffrey O’Connell & John Linehan, Neo No-Fault Early Offers: A Workable
Compromise Between First & Third-Party Insurance, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 103, 134 (2005)
(noting that in worker’s compensation systems the injured party exchanges prompt, limited
pay-outs to forego the uncertain opportunity of the tort system’s riches).
322
See Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 314, at 115 (arguing that the VBIA has failed to
reach out to the “full, intended population of eligible claimants”); Lindsay J. Stamm, The
Current Medical Malpractice Crisis: The Need for Reform to Ensure a Tomorrow for
Oregon’s Obstetricians, 84 OR. L. REV. 283, 306 (2005) (noting that plaintiffs’ attorneys
contend that no-fault systems shortchange some injured parties who might otherwise fare well
under the existing tort regime).
323
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-15(f) (West 2012) (funding the NVIC through an excise tax on
each vaccine dose); Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics
Administrative Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV. 951, 976 (1993).
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those plans within the exchanges. The insurance industry, as a whole can better
absorb the impact of the cost of the fund than a smaller group of individual exchange
plans. Moreover, to the extent that insurers pass the fee along to their beneficiaries,
the cost impact on beneficiaries should be lessened because the fund costs are spread
out over so many insurers and their beneficiaries, not just the individual exchange
beneficiaries.
Second, part of the idea behind creating an insurer liability compensation fund is
to level the playing field between individual exchange insurers and employmentbased plans. Under the status quo, employment-based plans have an unfair advantage
over individual exchange plans because of ERISA preemption. The former can do
more than the latter to cut costs without concern for potential liability consequences.
Equity supports forcing ERISA plans to shoulder at least part of the liability burden.
To fund the compensation fund through individual exchange insurers alone only
moderately spreads the risks and costs and minimally alleviates the liability pressure
faced by individual exchange insurers.
A common concern with the funding mechanism of no-fault systems is that
funding such systems without tying the funding to individual fault fails to incentivize
those causing injury to mitigate the risk.324 Critics claim that where there is no
individual blame or fault, there is no deterrent effect on negligent actors.325 This
criticism is questionable given that the tort system has not effectively deterred
medical malpractice, and at least one study found that no-fault systems provide
better deterrence than the traditional tort-based system.326
Even assuming that the criticism is valid, deterrence concerns may be reduced in
several ways. First, if the VBIA compensatory event model is adopted, insurers
against whom claims are made will still have to participate, to some extent, in the
administrative process. The hassle and cost of participating in the claim process
should encourage insurers to take care when engaging in cost cutting measures.
Getting wrapped up in a myriad of no-fault claims every year certainly detracts from
an insurer’s bottom line and profitability. Second, the fee or tax on insurers could be
subject to increase annually, depending on the number and value of claims made
against the fund in the prior year. If, in a given year, the awards against the fund are
high, then a fee increase would occur the following year. Such a scheme would
incentivize individual exchange insurers to collectively avoid engaging in risky cost
cutting measures that could increase the number of claims against the fund and result
in an annual fund fee increase that impacts all insurers. Third, the fund fees could be
experience rated with regard to the individual exchange insurers’ contribution. In
other words, an individual exchange insurer with a high number of no-fault claims in
a given year would owe a greater fee the following year than an insurer with a better
track record. This would likely cause an individual exchange insurer to carefully
choose its cost-cutting measures, or risk an excess of claims connected to that insurer
and a higher fund fee for the following year. Of course, if the no-fault system is
324
See Henry Huang & Farzad Soleimani, What Happened to No-Fault? The Role of Error
Reporting in Healthcare Reform, 10 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 7-8 (2009) (arguing, in
the context of medical errors, that the lack of the stigma of fault in a no-fault system fails to
sufficiently encourage doctors to avoid mistakes).
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poorly designed, there is a danger that some weak beneficiary claims will prevail,
while some deserving beneficiary claims fail, resulting in some insurers overpaying
and others underpaying based on experience rating.327 Nonetheless, the use of
experience rating may allow the fund administrators to better set the appropriate fees
in order to ensure that the fund remains solvent.328
4. Other Relevant Considerations
Beyond defining the compensable event and the funding mechanism, there are
several other matters that should be considered in developing an insurer no-fault
system, including a statute of limitations, joint and several liability, comparative or
contributory negligence, attorneys’ fees, and the exclusive nature of the fund
remedy. First, there should be a timeliness requirement or statute of limitations for
the insurer liability fund in order to promote predictability, efficiency, and to avoid
stale claims. An appropriate statute of limitations could be borrowed from state
medical malpractice statutes of limitation, since the injuries involved are similar to
or the same as those in medical malpractice cases.
Second, joint and several liability should not apply within the context of the
insurer no-fault fund. Joint liability between providers and insurers is likely to be a
common occurrence in this environment as beneficiary injuries may arise jointly
from provider malpractice and insurer practices. However, the fund should only be
responsible for the percent of damages flowing from the insurer practice. To allow
for joint and several liability, increases the unpredictability and size of the awards
against the fund and potentially forces the fund to seek contribution from a fellow
tortfeasor, such as a provider, a costly and time consuming endeavor. Rather, the
HHS Secretary and the claimant should be allowed to submit evidence as to how to
apportion the damages, and the Special Master should make a decision regarding
apportionment of damages attributable to the insurer practice. The claimant would
then be left to pursue the rest of his or her damages in court against the other
tortfeasor(s). Third, contributory or comparative negligence should also apply within
the insurer no-fault liability fund. If the HHS Secretary can demonstrate that the
claimant contributed to his or her own injury, then the fund liability should be
decreased. Without contributory or comparative negligence, the fund would be
overpaying in some situations and some claimants would receive a windfall.
Fourth, attorneys’ fees are an important consideration. In the NVIC, attorneys’
fees are capped,329 but this has led to criticism that good attorneys’ are not
incentivized to take these cases and that vigorous advocacy is discouraged because
attorneys’ fees are awarded regardless of the outcome of the claim.330 Accordingly,
attorneys’ fees should be large enough to encourage attorneys to take these cases, but
not so large as to jeopardize the cost efficiency of the system. Moreover, the special
master could be given discretion as to how much to award in attorneys’ fees, based
327
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on the strength of the causation claim, thereby incentivizing attorneys to vigorously
represent their clients within the insurer liability fund system.
Finally, unlike the NVIC system,331 the remedy available through the
compensation fund should be final and should completely replace any available
judicial remedy that an injured beneficiary has against his or her insurer. To allow
for a judicial opt-out provision only reintroduces the tort system into the equation
again and undermines the no-fault system. It drives up the costs of the system
thereby limiting the funds available to victims and destroying the cost efficiency of
the program.332 Injured beneficiaries would have two bites at the apple,333 and if the
court system remains a resource for potential plaintiffs, then liability fears could
drive up insurer costs and cause some insurers to drop out of the individual exchange
market.334 Finally, despite the proposed finality of the remedy, it is important to
remember that some claimants may also still have alternative remedies available
through malpractice suits against their providers, even if they lose their insurer
liability claim.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given the lack of ERISA preemption for individual exchange insurers, the
exchanges are full of potential perils for beneficiaries and insurers alike. Under the
status quo, insurers are subject to potential costly liability if they engage in cost
cutting that leads to patient harm. The status quo fails to recognize that not all cost
cutting is bad and insurers should be encouraged to engage in beneficial cost cutting
of wasteful care. Moreover, insurers should be encouraged to promote low costs
within the exchanges in order to help the exchanges to thrive.
Beneficiaries, on the other hand, deserve a remedy when they are injured by
harmful insurer cost cutting measures. Nonetheless, unlimited liability of exchange
insurers will only lead to high premiums and costs for exchange beneficiaries. Costs
associated with liability and the threat of liability will most certainly be passed onto
the consumer in the form of higher premiums.
A balanced system should serve both the insurers’ and beneficiaries’ interests
and there are a number of options available. Most options are not political feasible,
practically feasible and/or are inequitable to either the insurers or the beneficiaries.
However, a no-fault compensation is an attempt to find a middle ground. It seeks to
benefit both the insurer, through limited liability and predictability, and the
beneficiary, through limited, but more certain damage recovery. The no-fault
331
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solution is not the perfect solution. It has its drawbacks, but it effectively balances
the interests at hand.
Still, it is important to recognize that the no-fault solution may not be possible at
this early stage of the exchanges. Oftentimes, the move to a no-fault system requires
a true and real crisis, as with the NVIC and the Virginia and Florida birth injury
legislation.335 Accordingly, it may require skyrocketing insurance costs within the
exchanges, health insurers leaving the exchanges due to high costs and many tort
suits against individual exchange insurers before a crisis level is reached and the
impetus for legislative action arises.
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